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Recently, we have been witness to a tsunami. This “third wave” of liberal revolutions in
Asia, Europe, Africa, and South America has begun to melt away the last frozen remnants of the
cold war.1 In the wake of these revolutions, as nations and states make the transition to democracy,
the question arises: “What is to be done about wrongs of the past?”2
Transitional regimes, in contrast to their autocratic and abusive predecessors, are committed
to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. To make good on these commitments, new states
must seek justice for victims and abusers. “Justice” is traditionally understood in terms of those
well-worn coins3 “responsibility,” “crime,” and “punishment.” It is, then, no surprise that criminal
trials and punishments often are the standard for justice in transitions.4 Unfortunately, traditional
theories of criminal jurisprudence have, for the most part, been developed in relatively stable states
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where the ideal is within the reach of aspiration.5 Alluding to John Rawls, Pablo DeGreiff has
distinguished transitions as “very imperfect worlds.”6 What he points out is that efforts to seek
justice in transitions face practical challenges that do not disturb views from crystalline castles.7
These considerations usually lead transitions to pursue “hybrid” programs of justice comprised of
limited prosecutions focused on top leaders,8 official or de facto amnesties, truth commissions,
lustration, and reparations.9
In transitions, and in transitional justice literature, hybrid programs are usually seen as
compromises born of necessity.10 Transitional regimes admit that it would be better to prosecute all
who had a hand in past abuses but recognize that it is simply not possible.11 Transitions must settle
for the best justice possible given very imperfect circumstances.12 Some have characterized the sighs
that accompany this view as hysterical overreaction, mistaking the practical challenges to justice in
transitions for insurmountable obstacles rather than simple variations of challenges confronted by
“ordinary justice.”13 There are, in fact, few, if any, hand-wringers among those interested in
transitional justice. It is true that, faced with the compromises borne of necessity, most transitional
5
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justice theorists express understandable regret that “more” justice cannot be done.14 However,
regret that more cannot be done is not the same as giving up on justice entirely.15
This article charts a different course, proposing a transitional jurisprudence that is, though
non-ideal, decidedly positive. It argues that the unique scale of practical challenges to transitional
justice present jurisprudential problems that are not satisfied by treating transitional justice as
ordinary justice.16 In particular, it emphasizes the importance of recognizing that pre-transitional
states are not simply crime ridden, occupied by awesome numbers of entrepreneurial and
independent criminals. Rather, they are defined by social norms, ontologies, and historical
teleologies that, operating through official state agents, construct a public face of law that sanctions
and organizes violence perpetrated by institutional actors and private citizens.17 This approach
appreciates that settling for the “best justice possible” leaves transitional justice theorists and
practitioners understandably dissatisfied.18 Contrary to the “ordinary justice” approach, however, it
contends that this discomfort is symptomatic of attempts to shoehorn stable-state justice theories
into transitions while failing to appreciate that defining features of transitions and pre-transitional
abuses have normative significance.19
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Transitional justice is an exercise in “non-ideal” theory.20 As such, it must take positive
account of the unique conditions found in transitions and their predecessor regimes in constructing
a transitional jurisprudence.21 By examining the unique conditions in societies capable of mass and
institutionalized atrocities, this article argues that most folks implicated in past wrongs should qualify
for an affirmative legal excuse. Further, it describes how centering transitional justice programs on
the proper provision of such an excuse justifies hybrid programs featuring vertically limited trials,
truth commissions, and reparations, as the best, not just the best possible, justice in transitions.22
This “excuse-centered” approach provides normative justification and practical guidance for hybrid
programs sufficient to silence the sighs.23
The excuse-centered approach advanced in this article depends, of course, on the normative
sustainability of the excuse. This article focuses on that task. The first section details the “justice
gap” that is the defining concern of transitional justice. The second section explores the normative
significance of this gap, arguing that mass atrocities are necessarily correlated with a public face of
law that provides abusers, in their roles as public agents, warrant to believe that their acts are right,
necessary, or at least not subject to punishment. Given this, the section concludes that, with the
exception of high-level leaders, most folks living under an abusive public face of law should qualify

I take this term from JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 5, 106 ff. (1999). Here I argue that transitional regimes are
heir to what Rawls would call “unfavorable conditions,” which, as Rawls would suggest, set normative, not just
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for an affirmative excuse based on the legality principal, a necessary element of the rule of law to
which transitional movements commit themselves. The third and fourth sections defend the
proposed excuse against challenges from deontological and consquentialist legal theories,
respectively. The final section provides a sketch of how the excuse, placed at the center of a
transitional justice program, provides both justification and practical guidance for other elements of
the hybrid approach, particularly truth commissions. While a full defense of truth commissions and
reparations is beyond the scope of this article, the final section indicates how the proposed approach
solves some of the most pernicious challenges to truth commissions and “restorative justice.”24

I.

THE JUSTICE GAP: PRACTICAL LIMITS ON CRIMINAL TRIALS IN TRANSITIONS
Among the most striking features of ancién regimes25 are widespread complicity and broad

participation in abuses.26 Political leaders, military personnel, executive officials, and police are
among the most notorious culprits,27 but they only mark the surface. Abusive regimes are
characterized by innumerable acts of unofficial violence, petty abuse, and discrimination.28 Their
histories are punctuated by murderous rampages perpetrated by erstwhile spouses, friends and
neighbors.29 These acts and events are, themselves, girded and sustained by pervasive public
See generally, DESMOND TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS (2000); Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and
Beyond Political Constraints, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 68; Jennifer Llewelyn, Justice for South Africa: Restorative
Justice and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in MORAL ISSUES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, 96 (1999).

24
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sentiments that provide support for abuses.30 Members of the international community frequently
fail to intervene.31 Corporate interests profit from abusive regimes and the victimization of
subjugated groups.32 In some cases, victims are complicit in the abuse of others.33 When it is time to
assign responsibility, then, tens of thousands have a share.34
Despite the incredible demands for justice, transitional governments face severe limitations
on their capacity to carry out criminal prosecutions.35 One of the most significant is the limited
availability of bureaucratic resources necessary to conduct prosecutions.36 There are simply not
enough judges, prosecutors, police, and other officials to meet demands and provide adequate due
process.37 Ad hoc and permanent international tribunals that attempt to provide additional resources
have proven to be woefully slow and incapable of making an appreciable dent in the demand.38

30

See generally SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL(2002); KOSOVO REPORT, 33-64 (2000); GOUREVITCH, supra
note 17, at 47-62, 96-131; GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 27-163, 416-54; JAIME MALAMUD-GOTI, GAME WITHOUT
END, 91-29-99 (1996); CARLOS NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 41-60 (1996); Richard Rorty, Human Rights,
Rationality, and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS 111, 112-15 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley, eds., 1993).

31

POWER, supra note 30, at 37 (quoting the suicide note of Jewish activist Szmul Zygielbojm).
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The infamous Indonesian oil pipeline is perhaps the most notorious recent example of this, but corporate profiteering
from Nazi crimes was notorious. Justice from some of these entities has been sought and awarded. See AUTHERS
AND WOLFFE, THE VICTIM’S FORTUNE (2002); Madeline Doms, Compensation for Survivors of Slave and Forced Labor, 14
TRANSNATIONAL LAWYER 171 (2001).

33

ELSTER, supra note 21, at 152-53; ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED 128 (2000); Areyeh Neier, in DEALING
WITH THE PAST: TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 1, 4 (Alex Boraine et al. eds., 1994).

34

MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 30, at 22-26, HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 2 (quoting Vaclav Havel, New Year’s Address,
UNCAPTIVE MINDS, 2 (Jan.-Feb. 1990)).
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ELSTER, supra note 21, at 208-11; Schauer, supra note 19, at 270-73.
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Posner & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 777-779.
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The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, for example, has been in operation for over ten years but, as of this
writing, has tried to judgment only twenty-two cases. www.ictr.org. This does not constitute a strong objection to
the existence of these tribunals, whose most important contributions are to international criminal jurisprudence.
These numbers are only meant to emphasize the impossibility of prosecuting, with full protection of process, all
those implicated in pre-transitional abuses.
6

An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 74 Ford. L. Rev. ___ (2006) (forthcoming)

Transitions also must face the reality that many of those who could carry out criminal trials
are tainted by the past.39 If these officials are forced to step down, however, then there are fewer
prosecutors, judges, clerks, jailers, investigators, and defense attorneys available to conduct
prosecutions.40 On the other hand, if tainted officials are left in place, transitions must be
concerned that former agents of abuse cannot be relied upon to blame their cohorts, much less
themselves.41 Beyond straightforward supply issues, then, transitions face questions about quality
and potential conflicts of interest that compromise further their ability to prosecute.42
Transitions also have limited material resources.43 In addition to justice, economic reform,
infrastructure, democratization, social programs, and myriad other needs make claims on these
limited resources.44 More often than not, these needs far outstrip the resources of a new nation,
even without competition from criminal prosecutions.45 In addition, transitional regimes have a
limited fund of moral capital and public support.46 The citizenry of a new state is seldom uniform in
its support of a transitional regime.47 Many will be concerned about the direction taken in
transition.48 There also may be significant skepticism about the moral standing of those charged

39

Schauer, supra note 19, at 270-72; PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS 88 (2001); Luc Huyse, Justice After
Transitions, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 104, 109.

40

Stanley A. Roberts, Socio-Religious Obstacles to Judicial Reconstruction in Post-Saddam Iraq, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV.
367, 389-90 (2004).
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Id.
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Id.
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Southern Cone, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 82.
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with carrying out transitional programs.49 Finally, a people exhausted by years of oppression and
revolution may not have the energy to sustain long public procedures, particularly if it means
delaying other transitional projects.50 In this narrow window of opportunity, transitions must
consider where it is best to spend precious resources. Efforts to address past wrongs should not be
pursued at the expense of other transitional goals if the trade-off threatens the success of a transition
itself.51
The practical limitations on justice in transitions translate into a number of more theoretical
problems. First, procedural justice, a necessary corollary of the rule of law, is frequently
compromised.52 In transitional circumstances, opportunities for vengeance abound and extra-judicial
punishment, including execution, is common,53 particularly when justice is left in the hands of those
without professional training or political accountability.54 Due process rights are threatened as those
arrested wait to be charged, wait for assistance of counsel, and wait for years to get their day in
court.55 Such results threaten the moral and political standing of transitions by compromising
commitments to the rule of law.
Second, equal distribution of justice is compromised. Because, as a matter of fact, not
everyone implicated in past abuses can be tried, all prosecutions will be selective.56 If the selections

49

ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 72.

50

Id. at 69-81.

51

De Greiff, supra note 6, at 81.

52

ELSTER, supra note 21, at 88, 235-40.

53

Id. at 97-99.

54

Id.

55

This is even true in the “more ideal” circumstances of the ad hoc criminal tribunals. See Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, ICTR97-19, Decision of the Appeals Chamber (Nov. 3, 1999) (releasing defendant for speedy trial violations).

56

ELSTER, supra note 21, at 208-15; HAYNER, supra note 39, at 12; Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 26-27; van
Zyl, supra note 5, at 666; MINOW, supra note 37, at 31, 40-47.
8

An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 74 Ford. L. Rev. ___ (2006) (forthcoming)

are driven by necessity, it is unlikely that choices will be made on principle.57 Ad hoc distinctions
and novel, post facto, rules breach transitional commitments to democracy and the rule of law,58 while
threatening to put the new regime in the same moral position as its predecessor.59 The results of
these selections are also, frequently, counterintuitive. Underlings are tried and punished while highlevel leaders escape prosecution, often by exploiting the fruits of their abuses.60 Thus, limitations on
resources result in too many and too few being punished, too severely and not severely enough.
Third, if criminal punishment is the standard, then justice will not be served in transitions.
Transitions cannot, as a matter of fact, prosecute all wrongdoers.61 As a result, many, if not most, of
the guilty will escape scot-free, including many of those most responsible.62 This circumstantial
parsimony implies that those who are not prosecuted are innocent of any wrongdoing and their
victims have suffered no wrong.63
Finally, selective prosecutions only address some wrongs, some wrongdoers, and some
victims. Thus, they fail to establish a complete and publicly legitimate account of the past.64 This
failure denies justice to victims whose abuses are never made part of the record.65 Moreover, the
nature of the “truth” established in a criminal trial is limited by the purposes of the trial—to
establish the guilt or innocence of particular individuals charged with particular acts—rules of
57

MINOW, supra note 37, at 31, 40-44.

58

Martin Golding, Retroactive Legislation and Restoration of the Rule of Law, ANN. REV. OF L. & ETHICS, 169, 170-174 (1996);
see also ELSTER, supra note 21, at 83, 235-40.

59

ELSTER, supra note 21, at 83; LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW at 39, 248-249 (1969).

60

James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals, 28 FORD. INT’L L.J. 616, 641-42 (2005).

61

Aukerman, supra note 4, at 51-53.

62

Kiss, supra note 24, at 68; De Greiff, supra note 6, at 81-82.

63

Pablo De Greiff, Trial and Punishment: Pardon and Oblivion, 22 PHIL. & SOC. CRIT. 93, 105 (1996).

64

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, I, chap. 1, para. 7, 24, chap. 5, para. 71, 73.

65

Rotberg, supra note 9, at 3; Minow, supra note 14, at 235.
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evidence, and other formalities.66 This is a limited truth67 that opens the door for revisionism and
potential backlash by failing to meet the transitional need for a full, historical, and politically
legitimate account of the past.68
The justice gap that opens in transitions is most frequently filled with alternative theories of
justice, such as restorative justice, 69 and alternative procedures, such as truth commissions.70 As
products of necessity, however, these efforts often appear as no more than accommodations that
provide the best justice possible given the imperfect circumstances in transitions.71 This is deeply
dissatisfying for both practitioners and theorists.
In my view, a valid and usable theory of transitional justice must take normative account of
these practical concerns, not simply accommodate them. Given that prosecutions in transitions
cannot, as a matter of fact, be complete, a “non-ideal” theory of transitional justice must propose a
way to make prosecutorial selections rational.72 It must provide a morally sustainable justification for
the parsimony implied by selectivity.73 It also must present the possibility that transitions can

66

HAYNER, supra note 39, at 100-02; Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 40-41.

67

MINOW, supra note 37, at 47, 60.

68

van Zyl, supra note 5, at 658-61, 667.

69

The concept of “restorative” justice has a topic of significant discussion in the literature on transitional justice. See e.g.
Kiss, supra note 24, at 68-69; Llewellyn, supra note 24, at 96. Restorative justice has also, increasingly, become a topic
of interest for stable state theorists. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime?: Prospects for Restorative Justice in the
United States, 1 UTAH L. REV. 413 (2003). This literature builds on earlier work done on rehabilitative and educative
justice more generally. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208
(1984).

70

Priscilla Hayner provided the first survey of contemporary truth commissions in Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994:
A Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTS Q. 597 (1994). She expanded and deepened her study in UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS:
FACING THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2001).

71

Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 26-26.

72

De Greiff, supra note 6, at 81.

73

Id.
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accomplish these goals within the limitations presented by their circumstances. Rationalizing
transitional justice programs as the “best justice possible” simply does not turn the trick.74
In the remaining sections, this article argues for a transitional justice program centered on
making prosecutorial selections according to an affirmative defense based on the legality principle.
This “excuse-centered” approach offers a rational justification for exercising selectivity in transitions
and provides guidance and justification for other common features of transitional justice programs.

II.

THE NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRACTICAL CONCERNS
Treating broad complicity as a practical limitation on trials in transitions begs a critical

question confronting transitional movements: “How could so many join to perpetrate atrocities?” In
this section I contend that mass atrocities are, in part, a function of social and legal norms. Absent a
socio-legal environment that supports abuse, abuses on the scale confronted by transitions would
not occur. Taking account of this leads me to argue that most who participated in pre-transitional
abuses should be excused from prosecution.

A. The Role of an Abusive Public Face of Law in Abusive Regimes
Who doubts that the Argentine or Chilean murderers of people who opposed the recent
authoritarian regimes thought that their victims deserved to die? Who doubts that the Tutsis
who slaughtered Hutus in Burundi or the Hutus who slaughtered Tutsis in Rwanda, that one
Lebanese militia which slaughtered the civilian supporters of another, that the Serbs who
have killed Croats or Bosnian Muslims, did so out of conviction in the justice of their
actions? Why do we not believe that same for the German perpetrators?
—Daniel Goldhagen75

74

Posner and Vermeule argue the contrary in Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, supra note 7.

75

GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 14-15.
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Genocide, after all, is an exercise in community building.76
—Philip Gourevitch

Mass atrocities on a scale that calls for programs of transitional justice are not phenomena of
happenstance in which thousands of agents independently and simultaneously decide to murder
their neighbors.77 The scale, breadth, and duration of these abuses evidence the fact that that there
is something that distinguishes the targeted violence committed by and under abusive regimes from
common criminal activity.78 One salient and important distinguishing feature is the role that law,
social norms, and publicly circulated and officially sanctioned beliefs, 79 collectively the “public face
of law,” play in abusive regimes.80
When looking at the Nazi Holocaust, or any number of genocides before and since, it is
tempting to think that only evil, irrational, or savage people could perpetrate these horrific acts on
such a terrible scale.81 Normal people, people like us, could never do what they did—at least not
willingly.82 While comforting, this intuition obscures an essential feature of mass violence: the

76

GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 95.

77

GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 15.

78

van Zyl, supra note 5, at 660-61.

79

These include a social ontology and a historical teleology. See, e.g., GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 47-62, 96-131;
GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 27-164; MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 30, at 71-99; NINO, supra note 30, at 41-60;
Rorty, supra note 30 at 112-15. Social ontologies are normalized typologies in which individuals are typed and situated
hierarchically. Teleologies provide abusive regimes with an account of the current conflict in a broader historical
context. Referring to this background, abusive regimes solve current disorder by devising and executing strategies
designed to make the real world better approximate their ideal end of history. This “final solution” often means
eliminating the target group entirely.

80

TEITEL, supra note 16, at 18-20.

81

Rorty, supra note 30 at 112-15.

82

GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 14.
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greatest of evils are perpetrated not by devils,83 but by and with the support of average citizens.84
Genocide and other mass atrocities simply could not occur without the participation and aid of
“willing executioners.”85
There are many implicated in mass violence who were not so willing, of course.86 Duress is a
frequent tool of abusive regimes;87 and those faced with a “kill or be killed” ultimatum cannot, by
definition, be described as “willing.”88 Those manipulated by combinations of drugs, brainwashing,
and threats, including child soldiers,89 who have been implicated in abuses committed in Sierra
Leone,90 Liberia,91 the Ivory Coast, Uganda,92 Congo, and Columbia,93 also do not fit neatly into the
category of “willing executioners.”94 In all abusive regimes there also are those who actively oppose,
protest, and work to prevent atrocities.95 Abusive regimes are, in short, far from homogenous.

83

I use this word conscious of, but distinct from, its Kantian meaning. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE,
8:355-85; IDEA FOR A UNIVERSAL HISTORY WITH A COSMOPOLITAN INTENT, 8:21-6. My argument in this article is
centered on the proposition that mass atrocities are perpetrated by members of the human race, Kant’s race of devils,
who, having failed to bind their actions to the demands of moral right, are subjects of law. I do not, however,
propose to forgive the moral lapses of pre-transitional abusers any more than Kant forgives those who fail to do their
moral duty. Devils are devils still, no matter the ineffectiveness of a devils’ solution.

84

GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 115; GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 164-66; Rorty, supra note 30 at 112-15.

85

I take this phrase from GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17.

86
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Even when these complexities are taken into account, however, it remains the case that
institutionalized atrocities require the support and participation of broad swaths of the citizenry,
including active participants, passive supporters, opportunistic profiteers, and those who indulge in
naïve denial.96 While we may applaud the heroes, then, we are left to wonder how so many were led
to such madness. The key to answering this question is to take seriously the possibility that the
practical realities of scale and complicity that distinguish abusive regimes are not merely differences
in magnitude, as compared to the everyday problems that face “ordinary justice,”97 but, rather, serve
as markers for unique social conditions that carry normative force, making it impossible to simply
dismiss transitional justice as a special case of everyday justice.
In stable states there is a close identification between norms and the norm.98 Wrongs, as
crimes, are the exception, perpetrated in violation of established and regularly enforced legal codes.
By contrast, in abusive regimes targeted abuse is the norm.99 Widespread abuses identify and are
institutional tools of pre-transitional states.100 In ancién regimes, black-letter law frequently fails to
condemn, supports, or even demands acts of abuse.101 Executive and judicial agents participate in
these activities, either directly or by sustaining an environment in which murder and other abuses are

96

Frau Maria, mother of the repentant soldier in Simon Wiesenthal’s famous essay THE SUNFLOWER, 84-94 (1998), is
the paradigmatic example for this class.

97

Posner & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 777-825.
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Id. at 660-61

100
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fought the Dirty War.); see also RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 62 (1961).
14

An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 74 Ford. L. Rev. ___ (2006) (forthcoming)

allowed to flourish.102 Police and the military join local officials in organizing and perpetrating
offenses in the name of the state.103 Other public officials organize programs of systematic
discrimination.104 These official acts form part of a “public face of law” that provides license for the
events that cry out for justice in transition. In recognition of the role played by the public face of
law in abusive regimes, transitions count amongst their highest goals sponsoring personal and
institutional reforms committed to democratic ideals, human rights, and the rule of law.105
The “public face of law,” composed of these elements, is not the same as black-letter law. In
some regimes, black-letter law requires abuse. This is not always the case, however. In many
regimes, laws on the books prohibit murder, rape, and other acts of violence.106 Unfortunately, “in
transitional periods, there is commonly a large gap between the law as written and as it is
perceived.”107 This perception, which reflects the reality of what law is in abusive regimes, is
regulated by social and institutional elements of the public face of law, which affect perceptions of
what is and is not prohibited108 and, perhaps more importantly, who is and who is not subject to legal
protections.109 Mass atrocities are not a coincidental collection of independent acts. Large-scale

102

The Nazi regime presents, perhaps, the most pernicious example of official participation in abuse. See, e.g.,
GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 97; SIMON WIESENTHAL, EVERY DAY IS REMEMBRANCE DAY 11-28 (1987); EUGENE
DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OF THE GERMANS 7 (1966), but some level of public support is a ubiquitous and necessary
condition of the mass violence that precedes transitional movements, presenting the need for systemic reform.
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See Rorty, supra note 30 at 112-114.
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abuses happen for a reason.110 In pre-transitional regimes the institutions that organize abuse reflect
a deeper social ethos, a historical ontology, and a narrative truth, that presents abusive practices as
rational or, in some cases, necessary.111 The Nazi Holocaust provides a stark example.
Nazi crimes, and the support provided by ordinary Germans during the Holocaust, were
sponsored by an “eliminationist anti-Semitism”112 that foretold a complete eradication of European
Jews.113 Public norms and an officially sanctioned public face of law, disseminated and enforced by
bureaucratic, executive, and military agents, played a critical role in the targeting of Jews and Gypsies
for death in Nazi occupied Europe from 1935 to 1945.114 From the first experiments with violence
preceding the passage of the Nuremberg Laws to Kristallnacht to the full-scale mechanized murders
perpetrated in concentration camps, Nazis’ killing of Jews was consistent with a publicly circulated
view that Jews had to be eliminated.115
The Nazis are not alone in drawing on historical teleology and social ontology to guide and
justify mass atrocity. Richard Rorty points out that a dehumanizing ontology, in combination with a
historical ontology, was at the center of atrocities perpetrated in Bosnia, where abusers did not see
themselves as committing offenses because they did not view their victims as humans.116 In a
110

GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 180. This should not be confused with cultural or social determinism. The point is
that certain social conditions are necessary for mass atrocities. Social mores do not act, however, and, just as individual
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GOLDHAGEN, supra note 17, at 20-22. As I argue below, these moral failures cannot be subject to legal punishment.

111
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chilling account of the Rwandan massacre, Phillip Gourevitch explains that the bodies that washed
up on the shores of Lake Kivu and Lake Victoria were sent on their way back to Ethiopia at the
direction of Hutu authorities as an expression of a historical ontology in which tall and light-skinned
Tutsis were aggressors from the North to be sent back on the waters that brought them.117 Asserted
differences in race and biology are frequent sources for abusive ontologies.118 An abuse sustaining
truth can also be more obviously political, as was the case in Argentina, where the “Dirty War” on
communism allowed state agents to torture, disappear, and murder thousands of Argentines;119 or
even consciously constructed, as John Dower documents was the case with war crimes perpetrated
in the Pacific during World War II.120
In some cases, state approval is tacit, manifested by passivity in the face of abuses.121 In
other cases state support is active and organized.122 In some cases laws against murder are not
enforced or are interpreted as not protecting some groups.123 In other cases black-letter law or
official state policies requires murder.124 In all cases, however, state support, expressed as an abusive
public face of law, is a necessary corollary of mass atrocity. To conclude the contrary would be to
117

GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 47-62; see also Collette Braekman, Incitement to Genocide, in CRIMES OF WAR 192
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claim that the Holocaust, the Argentine Dirty War, the abuses of Apartheid, and the Rwandan
Massacre were no more than unhappy coincidences of independent criminal action.
Calls for transition, and the institutional and social reforms that transitions entail, serve as
further evidence of this descriptive claim. While acts of violence stand out against the backdrop of a
stable state, the acts that characterize pre-transitional societies blend into a society whose pathology
runs so deep that massive political, social, cultural, and legal change is necessary.125 The requirement
for reform only makes sense if one recognizes that there is something deeply wrong with abusive
regimes.126 An abusive public face of law is both evidence of what is wrong and, as expressed and
advanced through public institutions, a tool of atrocity and the social truths that rationalize and
sustain abuse.127
It does not, for the moment, matter where the “truth” that underlies and sustains abusive
regimes comes from. Whether it is a result of colonial involvement, political strategy, or timeless
narrative, the effect is the same: there is a rational social grounding for pre-transitional abuses.128
This socio-ontological support combines with actual laws on the books, official doctrine, and state
practice to construct an abusive public face of law that affects interpretations of legal duty in abusive

125

van Zyl, supra note 5, at 661 (pointing out that criminal justice is more appropriate for stable states where abuses are
the exception rather than the norm).
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states and establishes the conditions necessary to perpetrate mass atrocities on a scale that requires
systemic transition and transitional justice.129
The public face of law in abusive regimes and the role that it plays in individual actions
highlights a critical difference between normal criminal activity and abuses committed by and under
abusive regimes without obscuring the importance of heterogeneity in pre-transitional states. Those
who participate in mass violence choose to become abusers, some grudgingly, and some with
frightening enthusiasm. The critical point that I will defend in this article is that these choices are
not made in solipsistic isolation. Abusive regimes are “burdened” societies.130 Atrocities committed
by and under abusive regimes reflect an operating set of socially generated and publicly circulated
beliefs that, in combination with institutional practices and government policies, form a public face
of law that at least does not forbid violence against a victim group, and often actively encourages it.
By making this claim I do not mean to defend or rely upon cultural determinism.131 Those
living under abusive regimes can choose not to participate in atrocities. That is a fact evidenced by
those who oppose abusive regimes from within, often at great peril of their own lives. I also do not
contend that conformance to an abusive public face of law justifies abuse. Rape, murder, and
torture are evils no matter what the law says.132 The only claim that I will make, the only claim that
need be made, is that the public face of law, as it appears to reasonable people living under an
abusive regime, does not forbid, and frequently encourages, human rights violations directed against
129
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particular individuals and groups.133 This official support distinguishes institutionalized mass
violence from banal criminal activity or small-scale abuses of power perpetrated by cadres of
opportunists134—the conditions well-understood by “ordinary justice.”

B. The Normative Significance of an Abusive Public Face of Law
The fact that past wrongs enjoyed official and social approval provides the substance of
significant deontological and consequentialist challenge to criminal trials in transitions to
democracy.135 Transitional movements count among their highest commitments dedication to the
rule of law.136 The rule of law, which shapes the call for trials in transitions, retains a strong
commitment to the principle of non malum sine lege, or the legality principle.137 Whether rendered as
non malum sine lege or a prohibition against ex post facto138 enforcement of law, the principle of legality
prohibits states from punishing acts that were not against the law at the time they were committed.
The problem of legality is at the center transitional of justice debates.139 The Constitutional
Court of Hungary met the issue in its review of a law allowing prosecutions of those responsible for
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134

Bhargava, supra note 100 at 46-50.

135

Aukerman, supra note 4, at 59, 75.

136

ELSTER, supra note 21, at 83, 235-40; Golding, supra note 58, at 170-174; MINOW, supra note 37, at 25, 30-37.

137

Id.; see also, ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 70-74 (4th ed. 2003); HERBERT PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79-87 (1968); JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 27-69
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the suppression of the 1956 uprising.140 The law repealed statutes of limitation and criminalized
activities that were encouraged under the predecessor regime. When called to rule on the
constitutionality of the new law, the equally new Constitutional Court recognized a “paradox of the
revolution of the rule of law” and found itself forced to decide between “the principle of
predictability and foreseeability” which grounds the “criminal law’s prohibition of the use of
retroactive legislation,” and the rule of law understood as “substantive justice.”141 For the Court, the
paradox was a result of a situational division between the rule of law as an agent of right and the rule
of law as a regulative ideal. In the end, the Court decided that the revolutionary role of law as an
agent of change could not trump the principles of predictability internal to the rule of law.142
German courts faced an almost identical issue in the border-guards cases.143 The guards
accused of shooting East Germans fleeing across the border claimed that they were executing a legal
duty.144 The German were asked to decide to what extent the law of the previous regime provided a
defense. Recognizing that laws, such as those under which the border guards acted, may be formally
right but were not substantively right, the Germans allowed the prosecutions to proceed.145 In terms
of the dilemma posed by the principle of legality, they were prepared to choose the transformative
potential of the law over its formal duties to predictability and fair warning.

140

Judgment of March 5, 1992, Magyar Közlony No. 23/1992 (Hungary, Constitutional Court, 1992), translated in J. OF
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These are but two examples. Because of the critical role played by the public face of law in
abusive regimes, all transitions confront legality. That courts have come to different conclusions
emphasizes the difficulty of the issues.

1. The legality principle as an excusing condition for most implicated in pre-transitional abuses.
Given that mass atrocities enjoy state support and comport with the prevailing public face of
law, broad criminal prosecutions in transitions would violate the principle of legality with respect to
most who might be targeted for prosecution. Taking account of legality in transitions does not,
however, require forgoing all prosecutions. Rather, a proper accounting of legality concerns results
in vertically limited prosecutions146 that focus on high-level leaders, who are directly exposed to the
demands of international law prohibitions against genocide147 and crimes against humanity,148 each of
which can provide grounds for individual criminal liability. 149

146

I am in debt to Paul van Zyl for this terminology.

147
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For an act to be a crime, it must be a transgression of law—nullum crimen sine lege.150 The
principle of legality in criminal jurisprudence is centered on two concerns. First, the fair and
legitimate use of the police power of the state is predicated on an obligation of fair warning—nulla
poena sine lege.151 Citizens must have a reasonable chance to know the law so that they will know
which acts will be punished and which not. This is really two requirements, one of formal
warning152 and one of clarity.153 Black-letter law or consistent state action satisfy the first
requirement.154 Lucidity, publicity, and regular enforcement satisfy the second.155 Laws that are
excessively vague, providing little or no guidance, are not enforceable.156
The second concern that motivates the principle of legality centers on those charged with
enforcing the law. Two key principles of fairness in the enforcement of law are predictability and
consistency.157 Black-letter law provides enforcement officials with the basic guidelines that they
need to regulate social behavior. Clear law guards against “discriminatory and arbitrary
150
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151
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enforcement.”158 Without law, police agents may act on their own impulses and enforcement of
social mores will be arbitrary, completely dependent upon the officer, prosecutor, or judge at
hand.159 Law provides a hub about which enforcement activities revolve. The principle of legality
ensures that regulation of social action, and the use of state police power over individuals, will be
rule-bound, consistent, fair, and legitimate. 160
Both of these justifications of the legality principle focus on the role that the judiciary and
the executive play in democratic regimes and under the rule of law. Judges and courts have the
limited duty to apply law.161 Law itself is to be propagated by other processes of justification.162
Courts may not, as a rule, indulge in this legislative behavior. The law that they are charged with
applying binds them.163 Without law to apply, courts and police are powerless to act or, rather,
without moral and legal authority to act. Exercise of state power in the absence of legal authority is
a hallmark of abusive regimes.164
One might favor a more active role for judges. Indeed, one of the reasons offered in favor
of criminal trials in transitions suggests that trials can establish and model the rule of law and claim
158
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ground for an independent judiciary.165 Moreover, the judiciary has historically proven to be a
valuable agent of reform in stable societies.166 Given these potentials, it might seem odd to take
such a strict view of the judiciary’s role in transitions when the need for reform is so great.167 There
are two points to be made here. First, the criminal law may not be the best tool in the arsenal of an
activist court. Reflection on the legislative adventures of American and British courts, for example,
favors activism only to sponsor tort or regulatory reform.168 Where courts do use the criminal law in
a reform capacity it is usually to add excuses or justifications rather than create new crimes. This is a
reflection of the principle of legality.169 Second, even if one were to approve the actions of an
activist court in creating new criminal prohibitions; this does not solve the legality concern. Law
written ex post facto is no more just for having been constructed by judges than it would be if passed
by a legislature.
The principle of legality, as I have presented it, might strike some readers as unique to a
positivist conception of the law.170 Specifically, the principle may seem to imply that “law” is limited
to black-letter law, without regard to natural right.171 Such a perspective begs important questions
about the source and nature of law and ignores a long tradition of scholarship that argues for a close
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relationship between morality and law.172 I will discuss these concerns in later sections of this article.
For now, it will suffice to raise a few points for consideration.
First, to the extent that the legality principle is positivist, the rule of law is positivist. This is
not as bold a commitment as one might think. One need not believe that law and morality are
entirely separable173 to believe that laws on the books play an essential role in the fair and just
exercise of legal force. The “rule of law” is not the same as the “rule of laws,” which more aptly
describes the “pejorative”174 use of positivism.175 Non-pejorative positivism simply points out that
law and morals are not necessarily linked in fact.176 The principle of legality is positivist insofar as it
recognizes that law and right may sometimes diverge in fact. Where this occurs, the principle
contends that punishment cannot be justified based on morality alone.177
Second, these debates are, in the present context, beside the point. There may be other ways
to conceive of the law that, hypothetically, would not be committed to the principle of legality.
Speculation about these other worlds serves little purpose in the present debate, however, because
legality is, as a matter of fact, central to the rule of law as it has developed in constitutional
democracies.178 Faith to legality and the rule of law is a central aspirational goal of transitions,179 in
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contrast to their predecessors. In the context of transitions to democracy, then, rejecting legality
would change the face of the movement entirely, putting the transitional regime at risk of hypocrisy,
thereby threatening its moral and political status and, ultimately, its potential of success.180
Third, the principle of legality is not unique to positivist conceptions of the law. It is a
function of other moral and political principles. As Lon Fuller argues, legality is part of the essential
internal morality of the law.181 The “rules” in “the rule of law” are the minimum standards necessary
to achieve an ordered society. Primary amongst these is a prohibition against ex post facto
enforcement of criminal law. To ignore this principal in practice would be to undermine the moral
and practical goals of law and legal practice. Thus, even if a transitional government is faced with a
past regime that can, in no way, be regarded as legitimate, just, right, or moral, the new state is
bound by its own commitment to the rule of law.182 To pursue a course of retroactive lawmaking
would be symptomatic of the very legal pathology that the new state aspires to cure.183
Finally, the legality principal is inextricably bound to core democratic and human rights
values of autonomy and concomitant limitations on the use of state power. The core interest
represented by legality is fair warning.184 In order to justify coercion, a violation of autonomy, the
law must provide fair warning. Agents have a right to know, before hand, that their acts are
punishable under the law. If there is no law, or if the law is too vague and ambiguous, then it is not
fair to punish an agent who had no warning that his actions would be punished. Efforts by courts
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or police to circumvent this principle undermine the very concept of the rule of law, which provides
for the ultimate sovereignty of the law itself,185 particularly in transitional regimes.186
The principle of legality comes down to a prohibition on retroactive enforcement of law.
Agents under the law must be warned that their actions are at risk of punishment. By definition,
abuses in ancíen régimes were not under such a threat. Thus, transitional courts cannot, out of
respect for the principle of legality, punish pre-transitional bad acts insofar as they were consistent
with the public face of law. To conduct criminal trials in these conditions would be to violate a
foundational principle of the rule of law.

2. The positive potential of legality in transitions, a focus on public agency
As is apparent in the foregoing discussion, the legality principle is concerned centrally with
persons in their roles as legal agents.187 The principle points out that individuals are only subject to
legal punishment in their statuses as legal agents. This is importantly different from the often similar
structures of moral blame inasmuch as the law plays a necessary role in constructing legal guilt.188
Moreover, the principle points out that legal punishment is grounded in a presumption that those
living under the law take account of law in their decision-making. Thus, punishment is reserved
exclusively for acts committed by persons in their public status as legal agents under the public face
of law. This is true for both consequentialist and deontological legal theories.
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Taking account for the role of legality in constructing legal agency and legal blame has
important negative and positive consequences for transitional justice. Negatively, taking seriously
the role of public agency in constructing legal blame reaffirms the consequences of legality as an
objection to broad criminal prosecutions in transitions. The legality objection assumes this account
of public agency in its prohibition against punishing violations of ex post facto law. The principle of
legality, and the concerns that underlie it, justify punishment by assuming that criminals were
warned.189 Punishing in the absence of the warning either violates the moral autonomy of the
accused190 or it is pointless,191 or both.
As to the second, Oliver Wendell Holmes has famously argued that law is, by its nature,
concerned only with effect, not moral culpability.192 His fellows and followers calculate punishment
according to equations of deterrence and social cost.193 The publicly accessible agent is front and
center in such theories. Punishment is rational only inasmuch as it can, by threat, play a part in the
decisions of those living under the law. As H.L.A. Hart puts it, law is designed “to guide individuals’
choices as to behavior by presenting them with reasons for exercising choice in the direction of
obedience.”194 “Reasons” here go beyond simple threats. Law also serves an expressive function,
publicly declaring what is right.195 In any event, punishing past acts based on novel shifts in the
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public face of law is without purpose because the changes do not, by definition, have an impact on
the legal agent in her pre-shift public mode and punishing based on pre-shift acts does not provide
significant comparative benefit over punishment based on post-shift acts.196
Taking note of the role of public agency highlighted by the legality principle also has positive
import for consequentialist-oriented approaches to transitional justice. By making public agents the
objects of punishment, advocates of utilitarian legal theories depend on the possibility that those
living under the law could act differently under a different public face of law. Reflecting back to the
principle of legality, the objection points out that former abusers might well act differently under the
laws of a new state. It would be inefficient, pointless, and ultimately unfair197 to assume otherwise.
It follows that consequentialist law enforcement concerns, such as deterrence, are better served in
transitional circumstances by focusing on post-transitional behavior.198
Deontological constructions of legal wrong also invoke a public agent, suggesting negative
and positive effects on transitional justice. The legality principle is, as Jerome Hall points out, a
solution to the problem of coercing autonomous agents.199 Treating another as an end, and not
merely as a means, assumes that they had the relevant capacities and information to make a
decision.200 Knowledge and intent are central in this model of agency. Assigning blame and
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responsibility operates with the assumption that the accused can appreciate the wrongness of her
actions. Punishment is, thus, designed to reflect on the nature of the wrong, treating the criminal as
an agent who has chosen her acts. Owing to this account, Hegel argued that punishment is a right
of the criminal, reflective of her autonomy.201 Reciprocally, if, an agent could not have known that
her action was illegal, as distinct from simply wrong, then there is no ground to hold her criminally
liable.202
In a transitional context, trials violate the autonomy of agents cast in their public roles under
the law by punishing them for actions that were not, in fact, against the public face of law
propagated by the abusive regime. Note that this does not extend to moral blame. The legality
excuse that I am proposing is exclusively a function of the split between moral and public agency
and the corresponding division between moral and legal blame.203 The principle of legality provides
a shield against legal punishment only. There is plenty of room left over for assignments of moral
blame and responsibility for repair and reform.204
Beyond the deontological concern for treating individuals as ends, Kant is well-known for
his assertion that law is a tool for solving the problem of justice among a race of devils.205 Even for
Kant, then, law is, at least in part, a coercive tool, playing a role similar to that played in more purely
consequentialist theories of criminal punishment. Pointing out that devils should not be punished
for failures of the public face of law is simply to say that it is both unjust and pointless to “make
someone suffer a punishment unless the individual was given a fair warning that his act would bring
201
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it down on him.”206 My claim is not that abusers from the past would have acted differently if they
had been living in a different legal culture; rather, the claim from legality is that it is unfair and
inefficient to assume that they would not have.
Trials, as opposed to private condemnation or moral blame, assume the existence of a legal
prohibition in the construction of responsibility and the justification of punishment. Understanding
the agency significance of legality puts an important positive spin on objections to transitional trials
derived from the legality principal. Specifically, by recognizing the role of an abusive public face of
law in pre-transitional abuses, transitional regimes can recognize not only the transitional potential
of political, social, and legal reform, but also the transitional potential of individual abusers.
Transitional jurisprudence must take normative account of this and design transitional procedures
that reflect potential for change. The legality objection is one result of this accounting. As I argue
in the remainder of this article, proper distribution of an excuse based on legality provides both a
normative structure for hybrid programs of transitional justice and practical guidance for executing
these programs in particular transitional circumstances.

C. An Affirmative Excuse Based on Legality
Pre-transitional bad acts reflect an abusive public culture. An abusive culture is, in turn,
linked to broad complicity in abuses committed by and under pre-transitional regimes. Broad
complicity poses problems for justice in transitions both because of the large numbers of potential
defendants and because it exposes deeper, more theoretical, problems for criminal trials in
transitions posed by legality. A transitional movement must sort through these problems if it hopes
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to seek justice for past wrongs. The key shift in thinking that I am motivating is a realization that
these challenges do more than pose problems for programs of prosecution in transitions—they
point out transitional differences that must be accounted for by transitional jurisprudence, not
merely accommodated.207
Since transitional justice is an exercise in non-ideal theory,208 a full accounting of these
elements should provide some positive descriptive significance for a jurisprudential theory of
transitional justice. One key feature of transitions that must be accounted for is the fact that there is
a transition. Stable state justice is a matter of enforcing and further refining an operating vision of
right. In transitions, the vision itself is under construction.209 Complicity, legality, and other
challenges to justice in transition serve practical and theoretical notice of the shift.210 The challenge
for transitional justice is to find a way to address past wrongs that is consistent with the basic tenets
of the rule of law, but takes principled account of the fact that there is a transition.
Taking note of the connection between pre-transitional conditions and pre-transitional
abuses on the one hand, and between transitional movements and commitments to alter the public
face of law on the other indicates how this challenge can be met. Advocates for criminal trials in
transitions are rightly concerned about limitations on and objections to prosecutions because, as they
see it, a transition that fails to prosecute all those implicated in past abuses compromises its duty to
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do justice, though necessity may demand such a compromise.211 In my view, this is too drastic a
conclusion.
If the factors that impose limitations on criminal prosecutions describe unique conditions
that have theoretical significance for transitional jurisprudence, then it is not the case that limited
prosecutions are compromises against justice in transitions. Quite the contrary, the point is that
broad prosecutorial strategies are not “transitional.” They are ill-considered attempts to recreate
stable state justice in transitions that fail to take account of transitional realities and to capitalize on
transitional opportunities.
Recognizing the role of the public face of law in abusive states in light of transitional
commitments to legality erases the apparent justice gap opened between the numbers of those
implicated in past wrongs and the capacity of transitions to conduct criminal trials. Broad complicity
and correspondingly large numbers of potential defendants reflect the fact that publicly and
institutionally approved practices and social norms fuel pre-transitional abuses. Given that most of
those who participated in pre-transitional abuses lived under an abusive public face of law, broad
prosecution programs are not appropriate because most of those who would be prosecuted should
not be, according to the principle of legality. It is not merely that transitions cannot punish all of
those implicated in past abuses; most of those implicated ought not to be punished.
Legality concerns are best met, then, not by giving up on criminal trials altogether, but by
determining who might qualify for an affirmative defense. While the details of such an excuse would
be context dependant, for purposes of advancing the conversation, I offer the following:
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DEFENSE FROM LEGALITY
1. It is an affirmative defense for the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense
if the act reflects a reasonable interpretation of the prevailing public face of law. “Public face of
law” encompasses formal legislation, executive orders, the body of prevailing public threats,
institutional expectations represented by institutional agents, and commonly represented public
and legal expectations as they would have been perceived by a reasonable person in the actor’s
condition and position at the time of his act.
2. The legality defense is not available if:
a. The act is not within the scope of expectations present in public face of law.212
b. The act does not reflect the public demands on the claiming agent.
c. The agent is not, himself or herself, subject to the relevant body of public law.
d. The agent is directly responsible to another body of law and is not under direct threat from
the body of public law that is claimed as the source of a defense.213
e. The actor is under obligations that reflect a special status to which he or she has voluntarily
submitted where this status is expected to supercede all other demands on his or her
behavior.214
Providing a defense to agents of pre-transitional abuse based on the legality principle
performs the necessary practical and theoretical task of converting the unique characteristics that
define pre-transitional abuses and transitions into normative conditions relevant to transitional
justice-seeking. Extension of the excuse recognizes that many, if not most, pre-transitional bad acts
were committed by individuals who, given the nature of the public face of law under the abusive
regime, were justified in believing that what they did was right, necessary, or at least not subject to
legal punishment.
212
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Recognizing transitional commitments to the rule of law in this way also highlights the
prospective nature of transitional justice.215 The function of trials in stable states is to reaffirm
commitments to right established by law.216 Transitional justice is, in large part, a process of
rejecting old commitments embodied in the abusive public face of law in order to establish new
commitments to democratic principles, human rights, and the rule of law.217 Transitions are defined
by the need to produce significant changes in public norms, practices, and consciousness in order to
carry an abuse-ridden society into a new period characterized by commitments to human rights and
the rule of law.218 Organizing transitional justice programs around recognition and extension of an
excuse to individual actors serves these prospective transitional justice goals in a number of ways.
First, it highlights the potential and necessity to transform citizens of an abusive regime into
citizens of a post-transitional state. The principle of legality is as much concerned with agents as
laws. The proposed excuse recognizes a distinction between individuals acting in a private versus a
public mode. Many of those who committed abuses in the past were acting in a public mode in ways
that were, when the totality of pre-transitional public conditions is taken into account, theoretically
predictable. The fact of broad complicity points out that part of the process of justice in transitions
is transforming norms. The legality objection points out is that most of those complicit are
candidates for change.
Second, focusing on the role of public norms in abuses sets the stage for production of a full
account of the past that allows a transitional movement to mark cites for change and publicly
establish commitments to new norms. Proper extension of the excuse requires establishment of a
215
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clear historical record of the past in order to determine who should and who should not be excused
and to further the necessary process of converting the old public face of law into the new. Trials, on
the other hand, run the risk of neglecting the fact that there is a transition. By trying to keep
transitions in the mold of stable state criminal jurisprudence, trial advocates fail to take account of
the fact that transitional justice must be both prospective and retrospective in ways that stable state
justice is not.219
This proposed defense invites obvious objections, particularly when it is pointed out that
abuses commonly violate the most basic tenets of civilized law.220 Concerns may also be raised as to
the premium the excuse puts on the principle of legality. Committed consequentialists might, for
example, argue for rejection or suspension of the legality principle in favor of practical goals such as
deterrence and incapacitation. I address these concerns in the next two sections of this article.
Building on this discussion, in the last section I suggest how transitional justice procedures can be
“excuse-centered,” and how this approach provides justification, support, and guidance for truth
commissions and other elements of the “hybrid” approach.

III.

DEFENDING THE DEFENSE PART 1: OTHER SOURCES OF LAW
Section II argued against individual criminal liability in transitions by making use of the

principle non malum sine lege, commonly called the legality principle. This position may seem
unattractive for a number of reasons. Among these is that the legality objection, as I have developed
it so far, seems to rely on a strictly positivist account of law. A naturalist might object, arguing that
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laws demand obedience as a function of their proximity to natural right, that state codes inconsistent
with natural law cannot demand obedience, that natural law exists independently of state codes, and
that natural law creates direct obligations regardless of conflicting state codes. 221 From this, a
naturalist could conclude that everyone has a standing obligation to the natural law that is not
excused by interference from immoral state codes of conduct.222
This is an argument with some currency in transitional justice debates.223 It was, for
example, used at Nuremberg224 and in the German border guard cases.225 Beyond this historical
significance, this basic line of response, which appeals to a source of “law” outside of state codes,
can be applied equally to justify punishment based on, for example, international law. In this section
I respond to this line of argument by motivating a distinction between legal culpability and moral
responsibility that is based on epistemic duties unique to agents in their public versus private modes.
I proceed by suggesting that the “strict liability” approach to blame suggested by the naturalist line
does not account for the role that the public face of law plays in the lives of public agents. I
conclude, however, that the unique positions occupied by high-level leaders vis-à-vis international law
leave them vulnerable to prosecution.
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A. Fears of Radical Skepticism
I will grant, both for purposes of the argument and because I think it is true, that murdering
thousands of innocents is wrong, even if no domestic laws recognize that it is so.226 My argument
for an affirmative defense does not imply that there are not higher callings than laws on the books.227
Neither does it imply that “bad” laws can demand obedience.228 My focus is on the fact that the
public face of law in abusive states intervenes between individuals and moral right in such a way that
reasonable people living in these regimes may make mistakes about what they ought and ought not
to do. Because the source of this confusion benefits from the apparent stamp of official state
approval,229 is external to the agent, and is, by definition, removed in the process of transition, the
legality principle points out that punishment is inappropriate. That this is so implies neither that
pre-transitional abuses were right nor that those implicated did not have a duty to know better and
do otherwise.
The naturalist objection is, at its core, fed by fear of a skepticism of duties to the good that
my argument does not implicate. To illuminate the point it is useful to consider the full extent of
the naturalist critique by way of a discussion of excuse defenses. Mistakes of fact generally provide
an excuse from legal blame.230 Consider, for example, a hiker who, walking through a public forest,
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unwittingly takes a path leading onto private property, thus committing the crime of trespass.231
Unless this is a strict liability offense, the trespasser would not, and should not, be blamed for his
trespass if he both did not know and could (or should) not have known that he was walking on
private rather than public land.232
The naturalist objection sees the legality defense as proposing a parity between mistakes of
fact and mistakes of the good such that blameless errors of right should provide an excuse on par
with mistakes of fact. The argument proceeds from the premise that blameless moral ignorance is
just as possible as blameless ignorance of facts. There are really two ideas here. The first is that
moral ignorance is possible. The second is that one can be blameless for these mistakes. Sincere
differences in moral belief provide ample proof of the first assertion. While a relativist may look at
such differences and claim that neither disputant is “mistaken,” the abuses perpetrated in pretransitional regimes provide examples of opinions that challenge the moral agnostic to stay
neutral.233 The more interesting issue is, then, whether blame is appropriate when a wrongdoer acts
in accord with a mistaken belief that what he is doing is right, or, at least, not wrong.
The legality excuse I have proposed contends, without apparent limitation, that blame is not
appropriate if bad acts are functions of social beliefs, practices, and norms. While my proposed
defense is not a cultural defense, there are some parallels that are worth considering in the face of
the naturalist objection. Consider, for example, a Hittite living in the Near East in 100 B.C.234 The
231

I take this example and the argument for radical skepticism from Gideon Rosen’s unpublished paper Responsibility and
Moral Ignorance available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/clppt/program2001/readings/index.html. Rosen presented this
paper to the 2001 Philosophy Colloquium at New York University School of Law. There Rosen made clear that this
paper is an experiment and is not to be taken as representing his final thoughts on the subject of moral responsibility.

232

J. L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in 1 ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY PROCEEDINGS, LVII, 20 (1956-1957) (discussing duty to
take reasonable care in order to avoid preventable ignorance).

233

MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY: COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND THE LAW at 24-35 (1997).

234

I borrow this example from Rosen, supra note 231.
40

An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 74 Ford. L. Rev. ___ (2006) (forthcoming)

Hittite would have been shaped by the ubiquitous practice of slavery and the commonly shared
belief system that made slavery a perfectly acceptable practice. He would, predictably and naturally,
have grown up thinking that, while it was bad to be a slave, there is nothing inherently wrong with
the practice of slavery.235
Of course, it is one thing to claim that the Hittite did not know that slavery is wrong. It is
quite another to contend that this mistake is excusable. To render the Hittite truly blameless for his
mistake of right, it is necessary to contend that he did not breach a duty to “rethink the noncontroversial principles that form[ed] the framework for [his] relations with other people.”236 This
included premise makes a claim about epistemic duty, what one has a duty to know in the context of
norm-guided action. The legality excuse raises concerns for the naturalist because it seems to
endorse this added premise, asserting that duties to right begin and end with the duty to know what
public norms require, no matter how evil or misguided those norms might be. This is, of course, an
uncomfortable proposition.
Fortunately, there are good reasons to doubt the veracity of the added premise. Specifically,
it seems to miss a significant distinction between mistakes of fact and mistakes of right. Focusing
on this distinction suggests that we may have duties to know our duties, epistemic duties, that go
farther and are more demanding than is suggested by the quick switch from mistakes of fact to
mistakes of the good. Aristotle provides just such an argument in Nicomachean Ethics.237
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B. Mistakes About Particulars vs. Mistakes of the Good
In Book III of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle takes aim at Plato’s claim that nobody does what
is bad knowing that it is bad.238 Plato’s position is, in Aristotle’s view, tantamount to thinking that
evil acts are not voluntarily committed.239 Adoption of such a view shatters intuitive notions of blame
and praise by denying that anyone can be blamed for their evil acts. Aristotle’s response attempts to
reconstruct the possibility of blaming evildoers by distinguishing between mistakes of particulars and
mistakes of right. Aristotle writes:
Now every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he ought to
abstain from, and it is by reason of error of this kind that men become unjust and
in general bad; but the term “involuntary” tends to be used not if a man is ignorant
of what is to his advantage—for it is not mistaken purpose that causes involuntary
action (it leads rather to wickedness), nor ignorance of the universal (for that men
are blamed), but ignorance of particulars, i.e. of the circumstances of the action and
the objects with which it is concerned. For it is on these that both pity and pardon
depend, since the person who is ignorant of any of these, acts involuntarily.240

On this view, ignorance that may pardon is not of right and wrong, but ignorance of critical
exigent facts and circumstances that thwart an individual’s ability to achieve the intended
consequences of her actions. Bad acts perpetrated in the fog of ignorance of particulars are
excused241 because the action is truly involuntary. To use one of Aristotle’s examples, if Metrope
had known that the figure looming in the darkness was not an enemy soldier but his son, then he
would not have shot. Due to this mistake, Metrope cannot be said to have voluntarily shot his son.
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His involuntary mistake of fact qualifies him for pity, for his mistake and the loss of his son, not
blame.
Ignorance of right and wrong is, as Aristotle points out, quite different from ignorance of
particulars. Failing to seek out and know the nature of good will certainly lead to bad acts done by
reason of ignorance. Unlike Metrope’s mistake, however, these are errors of evaluation.
Perpetrators of such acts can only be called “wicked.” The wicked actor intends both act and
outcome, though she mistakes bad for good.242 If a wicked person who has intentionally done
wicked things cannot be blamed, it is hard to see who can be.
This distinction has obvious application to the legality excuse that I have proposed.
Consider the case of a Hutu who engages in genocide because he truly believes what the public face
of law tells him, that the Tutsi “cockroaches” must be exterminated.243 According to my discussion
of legality, true believers of this ilk should qualify for an excuse because the beliefs that they acted
upon are traceable to an abusive public face of law. On Aristotle’s view, the Hutu’s mistake is a
mistake of evil for good. He is, then, wicked. The wicked deserve blame, not pity. So, on
Aristotle’s argument, the Hutu’s ignorance does not excuse his act because the ignorance is an
expression of bad character.244 This claim for responsibility in transitions is bolstered by the fact
that in abusive states there are those who recognize the evil around them and actively work against
it.245 If it is not impossible to know right from wrong in an abusive state then there seems no reason
242
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to not hold responsible and punish those who fail to live up to their ethical duty to know right from
wrong.
Aristotle’s arguments seem to provide grounds for a devastating attack on the excuse I have
proposed. As it stands, the legality excuse appears to shift blame for bad acts, via bad character, to
an abusive public face of law. By focusing on a distinction between ignorance of particulars and
ignorance of the good and corresponding differences in epistemic duty, Aristotle seems to have
destroyed the premise that individuals have no duty to inquire beyond the claims of right present to
them in the form of the public face of law.246 Thereby, it seems appropriate to blame pretransitional abusers even if they act from real ignorance that corresponds to the public face of law.
They are wicked, after all.247

C. Legality and the Epistemic Role of Law in Public Agency
The Aristotelian/Naturalist line of attack misses the critical role, highlighted by the legality
principle, that the state plays in constructing legal responsibility. In abusive regimes, the public face
of law is such that reasonable people can conclude that what they are doing is, at least, not against
the law. Focusing on this feature of pre-transitional regimes suggests two responses to the natural
law objection bolstered by Aristotle’s distinction. First, the state must, in transition, accept some
responsibility for the ignorance producing conditions that existed under the old regime. Second, the
disjunction between law and moral right in abusive regimes highlights a distinction between private
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moral agency and public legal agency. Taking this into account suggests that, at least as a practical
matter, a distinction between moral culpability and legal liability should be made in transitions.248
This approach preserves the possibility of moral blame but, by forgoing legal punishment,
appreciates the commitment to fair-warning that girds the legality principle.
Aristotle’s defense of moral responsibility comes down to an argument that we each have an
unmediated duty to know our duty. While this position may be sustainable, it does not properly
apply in the legal context. To see how this is so, it is important to focus on the conditions that
create excusable ignorance. Even for Aristotle, ignorance of particulars is not a complete defense.249
We each have a basic responsibility to know facts and conditions that a reasonable person in our
position would know. Ignorance produced by laziness and inattention is not excusable. Agents are
excused, however, for “ignorance for which they are not, themselves, responsible.”250 If our
ignorance is a result of deception or misinformation from another source then we may not be to
blame when this ignorance leads us to do harm. Despite this admission, Aristotle stands firmly by
his claim that “wickedness is voluntary”251 and not to be excused, no matter, it seems, the role that
external conditions might play.
These positions may seem somewhat at odds. The solution, which is resident in Aristotle’s
argument, is that agents have different levels of epistemic duty with respect to particulars on the one
hand and the good on the other. Specifically, what Aristotle must argue is that, as autonomous and
reflective beings, moral agents have the capacity and, thus, the duty, to discover directly the moral
truth on their own. While conditions in the world may affect moral knowledge, the external world
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does not mediate between agents and the good. Therefore, conditions in the world cannot waive
duties to know the good.
Knowledge of particulars, by contrast, can only be gained through our senses. By virtue of
this fact, conditions in the world directly mediate between the truth about particulars and knowledge
of particulars. Agents do not, then, have exclusive control over their knowledge of particulars. In
Metrope’s case, for example, the play of light and shadows, conditions of the world that he could
not control, led to his mistaking his son for an enemy soldier.252 It follows that agents cannot be
kept to the same stringent epistemic duties that hold with respect to the nature of the good. For
knowledge of particulars, the highest reasonable epistemic duty is the duty to take care.253 For
knowledge of the good, the duty is absolute.
I agree that wicked people who do wicked things should be blamed. I agree that pretransitional abusers, wicked people indeed, should be subject to blame. I maintain, however, that
they should not be subjected to legal punishment. To see how I can hold both views it is critical to
focus on the limited impact of the affirmative excuse I am proposing. The legality excuse does not
propose to exonerate wrongdoing or to shift epistemic duties entirely. Provision of the excuse does
not imply that no wrong has been done or that those implicated in pre-transitional abuses should
not have acted otherwise. It is a legal excuse derived from the failure of a regime to provide fair
warning of the legal consequences of an action. The excuse focuses on the privilege to punish and
the conditions that a state must meet in order to claim this privilege. It points out that if a state fails
to meet its burden then it must forgo its privilege to punish. Pre-transitional states fail to meet
burdens of fair warning. It follows that a transitional regime, as heir to the past, must provide a legal
252
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excuse for those who acted within the behavioral boundaries established by an abusive public face of
law.
Responses to legality concerns that focus on individual responsibility, such as those
attributed to Aristotle and the Naturalist here, indulge in a non sequitur. The failure of a state to fulfill
the formal requirements that it must in order to claim the privilege to punish is separable from
concerns relating to ethical duties to know right from wrong and moral obligations to act
appropriately. A state’s duty to inform its citizens about what the law requires also has epistemic
consequences. The legality principle proscribes that fair warning is a prerequisite to just
punishment.254 What the principle highlights is that, from a criminal law point of view, the state
necessarily mediates between the natural law and citizens. It may well be the case that a state that
fails in its duty to conform state law to the natural law does not deserve faith and respect.255 It may
even be true that there is no obligation to obey bad law so that state law that is contrary to the
natural law cannot bind citizens.256 None of this implies, however, that a state that propagates an
abusive public face of law is morally entitled to punish citizens who obey just because that law does
not conform to the natural law. Such would be both “brutal” and “absurd.”257
The state is a conduit for knowledge of right and wrong within the pathway of criminal
justice leading up to prosecution and punishment. Therefore, while citizens may have the capacity
and bear the duty to know the good on an individual basis, there can be no criminal consequence for
failure to fulfill this epistemic duty.258 The only epistemic duty that can have criminal consequences
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is the duty to know what the public face of law demands.259 Where, as in abusive states, the public
face of law creates conditions in which reasonable people can be led to make mistakes about what is
right, those who act out those mistakes cannot be held criminally accountable without violating
legality260 because they have met their public legal duty by knowing what the law demands. They
may be blamed for their moral failures, but they may not, consistent with core demands of the rule
of law, be punished criminally.261 Reciprocally, the regime that has enabled that mistake loses its
moral entitlement to punish.262
None of this is inconsistent with praising those who rise above the abusive conditions of a
pre-transitional state. We can, and should, celebrate the Oskar Schindlers of the world. That we do,
however, does not require that we punish those who follow the law. Legal wrong is not the same as
wickedness. The state bears responsibility for defining legal wrong and for establishing conditions
consistent with legal education and habituation of citizens. Given this duty, citizens may, in their
public roles as legal agents, rely on the public face of law as the standard bearer of legal right and
wrong. When the state fails to do its part, the legality principle dictates that the state must sacrifice
its privilege of punishment in deference to fairness and respect for the autonomy of its citizens. For
a transitional regime to do otherwise would put it in no better a moral position than its
predecessor.263
The excuse I have proposed is limited to legal agents in their public modes. It has no
footing in and no consequences for moral agency. Moral blame may still be appropriate for the
259
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knowing commission of any act that is wrong.264 A morally blameworthy act may also have legal
consequences, but this need not be the case. In a similar vein, morally appropriate acts may
sometimes be subject to criminal consequences. There is, as a practical matter, no necessity in this
relationship265 and so, no legal right to punish may be drawn from morality alone.
The legality principle respects the distinction between legal and moral blame by marking a
derivative distinction between individuals in their public legal mode and agents in their private moral
modes. People, in their roles as legal agents, are operated on by the laws, which make claims on
their behavior. Legal agency comes with its own obligations and epistemology. Legal punishment
pursues those who fail in their duties as legal agents. Punishment is forgone when agents meet the
demands placed on them in public, despite the fact that they lie to their mothers about taking the
garbage out. The legality principle points out that the same argument goes for all other acts that are
not prohibited under the law. Actions mala in se, like acts mala prohibita, are punishable only if they
are prohibited by law. That they are wrong regardless of the law is beside the point.

D. Justification and Application
This position is consistent with a familiar distinction, made in all rule ordered practices,
between justification and application.266 Games, for example, operate with a specific set of rules.
From time-to-time some of these rules may reveal themselves to be less than ideal with respect to
the greater goals of the game. Movements develop and opportunities to change the rules are
presented. These opportunities are limited to times and places outside of actual games, however.
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Therefore, if a striker in a soccer match is called offside she might appeal the accuracy of the call but
it would not be appropriate for her to appeal the fairness of the offside rule. In the game, the rules
are applied. Conversations about their justification are reserved for other times and forums.
Law is similar to games in recognizing a firm distinction between justification and
application.267 The principle of legality is an expression of this commitment. The debate over the
source of law and the legitimacy of law is part of the broader conversations that rationalize, justify,
and, eventually, generate laws.268 They are the sorts of conversations engaged in by legislators, policy
wonks, citizens, and sometimes even philosophers, and are reserved for the senate floor, classrooms,
and civil society. Fetal norms that have not completed their gestation do not, until fully mature as
sanctioned law, justify punishment.
To illustrate the point, imagine that I am driving at 34 m.p.h. on a stretch of road that is
clearly marked as a 35 m.p.h. zone. When pulled me over and charged with speeding I contest,
claiming that I was within the marked speed limit. Now imagine that the officer agrees. He adds,
however, that this is his usual patrol and he has noticed an unacceptable number of fatal accidents
on this road. Furthermore, his department has conducted a study, the conclusion of which is clear:
if cars traveling that stretch of road drove at 25 m.p.h. dozens of lives would be saved every year.
Thus, he says, the speed limit really, by all measures, practical and moral, should be 25 m.p.h. He
writes me a ticket for going 9 m.p.h. over the correct—not the posted—speed limit.
Now we go to court. The officer acknowledges that I was within the posted limit, but
presents the judge with the findings of the study. Intrigued, the court conducts an evidentiary
hearing, finds in favor of the patrolman, and fines me for driving faster than I should have. In my
267
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appeal, my argument is clear: the judge and the patrolman overstepped their bounds. It was their
job to apply the law as they found it. By overstepping, they have created a Kafkaesque world of
inscrutable legal expectations.269 They have also unjustly used the law to punish me for an act that
was not, by definition, illegal at all.
It would still be unjust for the judge to punish me for speeding in this case if I revealed that
I had read the study before that fateful evening. It would be unjust even if I agreed with the study,
and thought that everyone should drive 25 m.p.h. Even if all of this were true, the laws on the
books set the limit at 35 m.p.h. More importantly, the signs on the road clearly read “Speed Limit:
35 m.p.h.” My duty as a legal agent was, then, to respect that 35 m.p.h. limit. So long as I have
done this, I am guilty of no legal transgression, even if, in a moment of private reflection, I agree
that I should have kept it under 25 m.p.h.
The same is true of someone who abided by the laws in place under an abusive regime.
Brought before a transitional tribunal he may, rightly, claim that he was following the law at the
time. It would be odd and out of place for the judge to respond by saying that those were bad laws
and the defendant should have known better. Just as it is not a defense in law to claim that the law
is wrong,270 there cannot be a legal obligation to ignore or break laws that go against moral law. This
is not to say that there is no moral obligation to disobey evil laws. As Socrates argues in the
Apology, there is.271 In a more contemporary vein, under United States law, those who claim
objective fear of future persecution may not gain asylum if they participated in persecution of
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another,272 even if under duress.273 By contrast, while applicants may not normally claim fear of
persecution based on threats of lawful punishment in their home countries,274 if the law violated
demanded participation in persecution, then fear of punishment based on a refusal to participate can
provide a basis for asylum.275 This apparent disparity is explained by the fact that duress is a legal
excuse, not a moral justification;276 and “asylee” is a moral, not legal, status.277 Denial of asylum to
an applicant who has, under duress, participated in the persecution of others, is acceptable because it
is a function of moral culpability, not legal liability.278
Legal liability is different from moral culpability. The legality principle marks this
distinction, recognizing that, while private moral considerations may be relevant to the justification
of law and to private decisions to obey or not, these private reflections do not provide warrant for
public sanction. Absent preexisting and legitimate, if not just, public threats, states lose their
privilege to punish. None of this, as I discuss further in the last section of this article, excludes
advancement of various forms of private guilt. Nor, as I argue in the next sub-section, does it
exclude punishment of high-level leaders.
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E. International Law: Distinguishing High-Level Leaders from those Excused
To now, I have focused on responses that refer to natural law or the demands of moral
right. Those interested in prosecuting present-day abusers need not rely on such abstractions. Our
contemporary international human rights culture279 boasts a well-stocked toolbox of treaties,
charters, and jurisprudence of crimes against humanity and jus cogens law, each of which may serve as
touchstones for transitional trials.280 In this section, I argue that these sources do not provide
warrant to prosecute those who live under an abusive public face of law, but do provide ground for
prosecuting high-level leaders exposed directly to threats of punishment under international law.
Crimes against humanity have been in the toolbox since at least the seventeenth century,281
but came into prominent use at Nuremberg.282 The Nuremberg Tribunals determined that
unconditional surrender entitled the Allies to establish criminal laws ex post facto.283 This position,
which smacks of “might makes right,” is only persuasive, if at all, on a practical level. Contemporary
prosecutions for crimes against humanity need not rely on this dubious ground, of course. Going
forward, the Nuremberg prosecutions established the international threat of punishment for crimes
against humanity.284
Appeals to crimes against humanity seem to solve legality concerns by replacing fuzzy
presumptions of universal right with solid claims of international law grounded in historical events
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and institutions, including prosecutions at Nuremberg, the International Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia285 and Rwanda,286 and, going forward, the International Criminal Court.287 With slave
trading and piracy, crimes against humanity also form the traditional core of universal jurisdiction,288
allowing foreign states to pursue prosecutions where transitional regimes are not able or willing.289
In light of recent prosecutions, pursued by individual states290 and by international tribunals, crimes
against humanity appear to provide both normative justification for transitional prosecutions and a
standing threat of punishment that persists where domestic laws enable abuse.
The duty and privilege of punishing crimes against humanity falls not on a particular power
but on humanity as a whole.291 Just as sovereign states committed to the rule of law must earn the
privilege to punish, so too, any authority that seeks to prosecute crimes against humanity must
demonstrate that it has earned this right. Members of the international community assert the
privilege based on previous enforcement efforts and on consistent defense of core human rights
norms.292 While compelling as a vision, this response to legality concerns fails to provide substantial
ground for punishing those who live under an abusive public face of law.
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While crimes against humanity represent a critical advance in international human rights law,
their presence on the international scene does not solve legality concerns in the unique
circumstances of abusive states, at least for those living under an abusive public face of law. To
meet core legality concerns of clarity, regular enforcement, and fair warning, the threat of
prosecution for violations of crimes against humanity must be present to those on the ground in
abusive regimes. Otherwise, crimes against humanity have no more normative significance with
respect to legality than remote laws of foreign states or laws propagated in secret. Unfortunately, for
most living under pre-transitional regimes, international law, including crimes against humanity, is
obscured by the local and immediate demands of an abusive public face of law.
Just as abusive regimes operate to obscure the demands of natural right, so do they hide
from domestic view the threats and demands of international law.293 This has two consequences.
First, as heir to abusive regimes, transitional governments have no more moral authority to punish
based on international law than natural law. Second, abusers living under an abusive public face of
law, because insulated from the body of threats maintained by the international community, are not
subject to the fair warning required by legality. Absent the coherent, clear warning demanded by
legality, members of the international community have no better claim to punish crimes against
humanity than do domestic authorities. That the failure is the regime’s, rather than the international
community’s, is neither here nor there with respect to the autonomy of prospective defendants.
Leaders are situated differently. Rather than living under an abusive public face of law, highlevel leaders have a duty to conform domestic law to the demands of natural right and to the core
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demands of international human rights law.294 While failing to fulfill this duty does not give rise to
individual criminal liability,295 recognition of this institutional role points out the unique position of
high-level leaders. As opposed to their subjects, leaders are exposed directly to the international
community. They may not claim ignorance of or insulation from threats of punishment posed by
prosecutions for crimes against humanity. That the vast majority of these prosecutions have
focused on high-level leaders296 strengthens the threat, and the point. So, while the historical fact of
prosecutions for crimes against humanity does not solve legality concerns with respect to those
living under an abusive regime; it provides ample authority for prosecuting high-level leaders who
use their positions of authority to construct and preserve a public face of law that encourages crimes
against humanity.297
Jus cogens and international treaties face similar limitations, derived from externality298 and the
intervention of domestic law. In addition, they face significant jurisprudential problems. Jus cogens,
“norm[s] accepted and recognized by the international community of States,”299 for example, are
only enforceable by states against other states and do not provide grounds for individual criminal
liability.300 The few international treaties that provide grounds for individual liability usually require
294
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domestic execution. While it is argued that some treaties are not so limited,301 this is a contested
view,302 diffusing any clear warning that the Genocide treaty, for example, might provide for those
living within the dense folds of an abusive regime. Regardless, even self-executing treaties are
obscured in pre-transitional regimes by an abusive public face of law.
High-level leaders in abusive regimes have good reason to question their commitments to
death and destruction. Since 1948 most countries, including most abusive regimes, have made
formal commitments to refrain from atrocities by becoming parties to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and other treaties and conventions.303 In addition to these documents, leaders have
become regular targets for prosecutions based on transgressions of international law.304 These
commitments provide the elite with adequate warning that they may be subjected to prosecution
under international law. This warning, unique to the normative and phenomenal positions of highlevel leaders, resolves legality concerns, which, I have argued, counsel against prosecutions directed
against those who live under an abusive public face of law.
The significance of the distinction between subjects and sovereigns is amplified by the fact
that abusive regimes are frequently autocratic. There are relatively few people in influential decisionmaking roles who are responsible for advancing institutional programs of abuse.305 Moreover, those
most responsible are often identifiable by the fact that they have authored and executed the key
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elements of an abusive public face of law.306 Having done so, leaders in these positions cannot use
as a shield the sword that they have forged.

IV.

DEFENDING THE DEFENSE PART 2: CONSEQUENTIALIST RESPONSES TO LEGALITY
To now this article has focused on deontological issues. This discussion has largely ignored

approaches to the problem of just punishment that focus not on abstract principles but on the
achievement of social goals, such as prevention of crime. In this consequentialist world, it might be
argued that the principle of legality can and should be rejected or modified if it interferes with the
efficient achievement of these goals.307 In this section, I argue that these concerns suggest a
program of limited prosecutions focused on high-level leaders as a solution to problems of
transitional justice.
Consequentialist approaches to criminal punishment are goal oriented.308 For the most part
they are, as Nigel Walker puts it, reductive:309 they seek to reduce crime. There are, in the traditional
literature, five main services that trials and punishment provide to this end:
1. Deterring the offender with painful memory of prior punishment
2. Deterring others, using the punished as an example
3. Reforming the offender so that she is less inclined to commit crimes
4. Educating the offender and the public to take a more serious view of the criminal act
5. Protecting the public by incapacitating the offender310
306
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These justifications are replicated in transitional justice debates. For example, Douglass
Cassel argues for domestic and international criminal trials in order to deter present and potential
human rights violators.311 Others argue that trials can aid in carrying a transition forward,312 in part
by demonstrating a public commitment to democracy and the rule of law.313 By deterring and by
educating, trials also hope to decrease human rights abuses.314 In addition, the goal of incapacitation
may justify transitional trials in order to prevent future abuses or counterrevolution.
This section argues that consequentialist goals of incapacitation and deterrence do not
support the use of criminal trials in transitions, at least for those who qualify for the proposed
affirmative defense. Most pre-transitional abusers, living under the immediate control of an abusive
regime and an abusive public face of law, are unlikely to be deterred by remote threats of
punishment.315 Further, given the shifts in law occasioned by transition, most pre-transitional
abusers are best treated as candidates for change. For those who are not, transitional regimes have
authority to punish post-transitional crimes. Consistent with previous sections, I maintain that highlevel leaders and others with direct exposure to the international community may be punished in
order to deter those in similar positions in other abusive regimes. Though I continue to argue
against broad prosecutions, I leave room for procedural approaches that focus on reform and
rehabilitation by arguing that most pre-transitional “offenders” are candidates for participation in
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the broader reforms that constitute transitions. Pursuit of reform and reintegration come at the
price of withdrawing the threat of punishment in most cases, however. The section concludes that,
by coordinating limited trials and truth seeking procedures, it is possible to avoid most of the
dangers of uncritical, de facto, amnesties while securing efficiently the transitional benefits that
advocates hope to achieve through criminal trials and punishment.

A. Deterring Future Human Rights Abusers
Deterrence theories focus on the decision-making processes of prospective criminals.316
Transitional trials motivated by deterrence attempt to create an environment in which the balance of
threatened punishment and provisional benefits tilts firmly against abuses.317 Transitional trials may
also hope to deter by publicizing the facts of past abuses,318 lifting the veil of secrecy upon which
abusers frequently rely.319 Finally, trials may hope to deter other potential human rights abusers
abroad.320 The deterrent effect of truth and punishment on the international scene is a central
argument in favor of an international criminal court and for international jurisdiction.321
This section makes two main arguments against transitional trials as a deterrent strategy.
First, criminal prosecutions are theoretically and practically unlikely to provide significant deterrent
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effect against future institutionalized human rights abuses.322 Second, to the extent that future
abuses can be deterred, transition itself, including shifts in social norms and public threats, provides
sufficient threat to prevent future abuses. The force of this argument is derived from the contention
that deterrence justifications, though initially appealing, fail to take account of pre-transitional
conditions, the places of individual abusers in pre-transitional states, and the impact that transitions
themselves may be expected to have on victims and abusers.
Jeremy Bentham describes the concept behind deterrence theory, often called as the “classic
school” of criminology, thus:
Pain and pleasure are the great springs of human action. When a man perceives or
supposes pain to be the consequence of an act, he is acted upon in such a manner
as tends, with a certain force, to draw him, as it were, from the commission of that
act. If the apparent magnitude, or rather value, of the pain be greater than the
apparent magnitude or value of the pleasure or good he expects to be the
consequence of the act, he will be absolutely prevented from performing it. The
mischief which would have ensued from the act, if performed, will also by that
means be prevented.323

The concept is not difficult to grasp. If the consequences of an action are more bad than good for
an agent, then she will refrain. Deterrence as a justification of and goal for public policy is
somewhat more complex, of course. Bentham’s formula simplifies the conditions in which crimes
are committed, and the subjective positions of criminals.324 It presumes that potential criminals are
rational utility maximizers.325 It also assumes a single, identifiable, and univocal punitive authority.326
It further assumes that the authority’s demands can be and are clearly communicated to agents.327
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Finally, it simplifies the concept of “consequences,” which are a function of punishment and degree
of certainty, the latter being divisible into risk of detection and risk of the consequence obtaining.328
All of these considerations make the deterrence thesis much more complex than it first appears. To
measure the potential of criminal trials in transitions to prevent future abuses of human rights it is
necessary to expose and investigate these complexities.
Deterrence theory makes law and criminal punishment a strategic game between rational
agents disposed to maximize the possibility of benefit and minimize risk of harm.329 The game
leaves open the question of who the players are, however. In transitions the subjective conditions
that affect participation in deterrence games are more numerous and the possible identities of
players more diverse than in stable states.330 Deterrence advocates usually fail to take proper account
of these added complexities. However, it is essential to be clear about who is deterring whom to
understand the dynamic relationships in the game.331 Absent this, the hopeful claims of deterrence
are too abstract to justify criminal punishment in transitions given the significant costs of trials in
respect of other transitional goals.

B. A Three Dimensional Analysis of Deterrence in Transitions

328

Aukerman, supra note 4, at 64. In formulaic terms: Deterrence = Severity of Consequence x (Risk of Detection x
Risk of Conviction). I am in debt to Richard Posner for deriving this formula for me.

329

Posner, supra note 193, at 1193; Becker, supra note 193, at 169; Bentham, Introduction, supra note 193, at 86-91;
Bentham, Principles, supra note 193, at 365.

330

Elster, Coming to Terms with the Past: A Framework for the Study of Justice in the Transition to Democracy, 39 EUR. J. SOC. 7, 37
(1998).

331

J.Q. Wilson, Punishment and Opportunities, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT, supra note 326, at 177, 187.

62

An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 74 Ford. L. Rev. ___ (2006) (forthcoming)

This section describes a three-dimensional model of deterrence in transitions, taking account
of those who might be deterred, their subjective motivations, and the source of deterrent threats.
The next section argues, based on this model, that only high-level leaders provide reasonable objects
for deterrence in transitions.

1. The first dimension: objects of deterrence
In traditional deterrence theory, punishment is designed to have either an individual or a
general deterrent effect.332 In the former, punishment tries to imprint the cost of crime on the
criminal herself, using her memory of the punishment to deter her from committing future crimes.333
General deterrence hopes that public punishment of criminals will put fear in the hearts of others
and, thereby, prevent them from breaking the law.334 In transitions, advocates also justify
punishment as a tool for preventing counter-revolutions335 by marking a change in the public face of
law and deterring those who oppose transition.336 Punishment also aspires to create an environment
of accountability where before there was impunity.337
Individual transitions to democracy are not isolated. They are part of broader efforts to
establish and extend a human rights culture.338 Punishing in a particular transition may, then, have a
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“super-general” deterrent effect, discouraging current or prospective abusers in other states.339 Of
course, to make the case for punishment on the basis of a “super-general” deterrence effect, there
must be compelling reason to believe that a domestic spectacle will reach across lines of history,
culture, and nationality. If this hope is too thin then advocates must accept limitations on trials
derived from other practical and moral considerations.

2. The second dimension: sources of deterrence
Transitions also leave open the question of who should take responsibility for creating the
deterrent threat.340 In stable states the answer to this question is obvious: the right of punishment is
reserved for a sovereign authority.341 In transitions, however, the candidates are more numerous,
including an outgoing government, a provisional government or successor regime, the United
Nations, regional transnational organizations,342 special tribunals, and a permanent international
criminal court. More recently, third party states have also made efforts to conduct trials. Spain’s
attempt to extradite Augusto Pinochet on charges of crimes against humanity is, perhaps, the most
notorious;343 but Belgium was the first to enjoy contemporary success in these endeavors, when, in
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2001, several individuals connected to the 1994 Rwandan massacre were convicted in Belgian
courts.344
These possibilities suggest nine model cases that deterrence advocates might have in mind
when they call for trials in transitions:
1) Domestic enforcement agents use punishment of individual abusers to deter those same
abusers from committing future abuses.
2) International and transnational agents use punishment of individual abusers to deter
those same abusers from committing future abuses.
3) Foreign governments use punishment of individual abusers to deter those same abusers
from committing future abuses.
4) Domestic enforcement agents use punishment to deter generally future abusers in the
domestic sphere. 345
5) International and transnational agents use punishment to deter generally future abusers
in the domestic sphere.
6) Foreign governments use punishment to deter generally future abusers in the domestic
sphere.
7) Domestic enforcement agents use punishment to deter generally present and future
abusers in the international sphere.
8) International and transnational agents use punishment to deter generally present and
future abusers in the international sphere.
9) Foreign governments use punishment to deter generally present and future abusers in
the international sphere.
Punishing agents need not confine themselves to one object population. The International
Criminal Court, for example, might hope to deter specific domestic agents, the general domestic
population, and the general population in other nations. Neither is it necessary that one agency take
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responsibility for trying and punishing all candidates for justice.346 Domestic and international
agents might coordinate prosecutions. The categories are not exclusive. They are merely a tool.

3. The third dimension: subjective dispositions of those deterred
Though they add some depth to an understanding of punitive relationships in transitions,
these nine models leave out what is, perhaps, the most significant dimension of analysis. Abusers
are not faceless agents who have indistinguishable attitudes and occupy identical positions. Abusive
regimes reflect a broad spectrum of abusers, running from dedicated leaders, to enthusiastic
followers, to those who abuse only to save themselves. It is worth distinguishing five groups in
particular:
1. Leaders motivated by deep political or ethical convictions tied to an institutionalized
worldview.347
2. Leaders motivated by personal interest and ambition.348
3. Followers motivated by deep political or ethical convictions tied to an institutionalized
worldview.349
4. Followers motivated by personal interest or ambition who take advantage of conditions
under the abusive regime (opportunists).350
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5. Abusers motivated by physical or social pressures, including threats of harm and pressure
from peers to conform.351
The primary reason for adding this dimension is to point out that abusers have different orientations
to abuse. Deterrence theorists often are accused of falsely presuming that criminals are no more
than interest calculators.352 While I think this objection is overstated, the underlying point, that the
position and orientation of actors is a significant factor in their relation to crime and deterrent
threats, is significant.353
With this three-dimensional model in view, the remainder of this section will argue that most
individuals who commit human rights abuses are unlikely to be reached by general deterrence
strategies, with the exception of leaders, directly exposed to the international sphere. In addition,
for followers, punishment does not promise a significant benefit beyond the preventive and
deterrent effects of transitional changes to the public face of law. Together these arguments lead to
a vision of limited trials that is consistent with the excuse-centered approach advanced in this article.
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C. The Limited Prospects of General Deterrence from Transitional Trials
“[G]eneral prevention functions in relation to those who do not ‘need’ it. In relation to
those who do ‘need’ it, it does not function.”354 Deterrence is forward looking, designed to inhibit
persons from choosing355 criminal activity in the future by imposing costs on criminal activity
sufficient to outweigh benefits.356 Deterrence presumes that criminals make rational cost-benefit
choices.357 This general conception of agency has some currency in common sense and in
jurisprudential theories advanced by eminent philosophers from Jeremy Bentham358 through Cesare
Beccaria,359 John Stewart Mill,360 Oliver Wendell Holmes,361 and H.L.A Hart,362 to contemporary
proponents of Rational Choice Theory363 and Law and Economics.364 Intuitively, it certainly seems
that we are inclined to do those things that provide us benefit and disinclined to do those things that
bring us pain.365 Even granting this, however, it does not follow that everyone works this way in all
circumstances.
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One common critique of the deterrence theorist’s model of agency is that it fails to take
account of crimes of passion.366 Crimes of passion pose a problem for deterrence in two ways.
First, passionate criminals by definition, do not act out of a fully rational state and are, thus, unlikely
to be swayed by remote threats of deterrence.367 Thus, policies focused on general deterrence are
unlikely to reduce crimes of passion. Second, passionate criminals, and particularly murderers, are
unlikely to repeat their crimes, so punishment serves no individual deterrent purpose.368
In pre-transitions, “true believers,” committed to the ethical, political, and cosmological
visions constitutive of an abusive public face of law, commit most atrocities369 and do so with the
most enthusiasm.370 The fact that many pre-transitional acts reflect passionate commitments raises
serious concerns for the prospects of deterrence in abusive regimes.371 Like passionate criminals,
true believers, caught up in the fervor of mass violence, are unlikely to be affected by remote threats,
particularly when the prevailing public face of law supports the view that what they do is necessary
and right.372
Not all crimes are crimes of passion, of course. One might wonder why, then, the presence
of laws and law enforcement do not deter all criminals in stable states. One possibility is that
366
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criminals are “broken,” or at least significantly enough unlike the rest of us to act like they are.373 In
cases of those with psychopathological and socio-pathological tendencies this may be true, at least to
some degree.374 But even sociopaths have sufficient interest in their own pain and pleasure to allow
decision-making consistent with the vision of rational agency critical to deterrence.375 The same can
be said of many, if not most, perpetrators of large-scale human rights abuses. Referring to the
model outlined above, true believers, opportunists, careerists, and even those under physical or
psychological duress, all make rational choices, though we may fail to fathom their logic.376 With the
promise of punishment, then, we might hope to tip the scales.
One might also speculate that criminals are different from law-abiding citizens in ways that
inoculate them against the deterrent forces of criminal law. For example, non-criminals are
predominately more risk averse than criminals, and are apt to inflate or take more seriously threats
of punishment.377 Non-criminals are also more concerned with public stigma and personal guilt than
are many criminals.378 Again, that this may be so does not require wholesale rejection of deterrence
theory. To the contrary, it proves the broad success of deterrence. Without any threat, more people
might be criminals.379 Law-breakers and recidivists may simply have a higher deterrence threshold
or they may not be in a position to appreciate fully deterrent threats. Either way, the fact of crime
does little to disprove the deterrent effect. Even the most criminally inclined are unlikely to commit
373
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a crime if they know they will be caught and punished. This fact demonstrates that most criminals
are rational. Assuming, for the moment,380 that pre-transitional abusers are as well has interesting
consequences for deterrence in transitions.
Many pre-transitional abuses are perpetrated by true-believers who act from conviction as
much as passion. 381 True believers do not weigh threats of punishment in the same way as stable
state criminals. They are motivated not by the prospect of immediate gain, but by a desire to bring
about a specific vision of the world as it ought to be.382 These are goals worth not only killing, but,
perhaps, dying for. A remote threat of criminal sanction is unlikely to be weighed conclusively in
the mind of such an agent. In fact, rather than deterring, policies of punishment, whether
international or domestic, often strengthen the commitments of true believers, deepening the
damaging effects of the oppositional or bi-polar logic that girds abusive regimes.383
True believers are not the only perpetrators of pre-transitional abuses of course. There are
those who abuse under physical, psychological, or social duress.384 These agents, though more risk
averse than true believers, are already acting out of a risk assessment that, reasonably and
predictably, puts a priority on present and immediate threats over remote threats of possible future
punishments. In general, agents who act under duress are unlikely to be deterred by exogenous
threats of future punishment.385
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Abusers who act out of ambition or purely private motives may be more likely to feel the
threat of deterrence. Corporate agents and businesses are a good example of risk-averse groups that
may take a longer view of their actions in abusive regimes.386 The threat of future sanction might
well provide sufficient threat to deter generally opportunists if they have significant exposure to the
international community and the threats posed by domestic and international prosecutions.387 Highlevel leaders, international corporations, and international financial institutions provide the most
promising targets.388 The same is not obviously true of domestic opportunists. They, like smaller
corporate agents, have a narrower view of the world, limited to the reality projected by an abusive
regime. Remote future threats are unlikely to dissuade most such agents. More importantly, these
are individuals best viewed as candidates for change. Those who are not will identify themselves by
attempting new crimes, solving selectivity problems and avoiding legality concerns.

D. Identification Concerns and the Limited Prospects of General Deterrence
Deterrence effects are not determined wholly by the receptiveness of potential abusers, of
course. General deterrence is also a function of how “present” threats are in the minds of those
living in abusive regimes. Certainty, not severity, is the engine of deterrence.389 Without sufficient
risk of detection and conviction, even the most severe punishment will fail to deter. In light of the
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unique conditions of abusive regimes, threats of punishment are too ephemeral, removed, and
temporally remote to provide the degree of certainty necessary to deter.
In order to be deterred, prospective abusers must identify with those punished. If they can
distinguish themselves and their situations then they are unlikely to feel the threat of punishment,
and, thus, unlikely to restrain themselves out of fear.390 The three-dimensional model of abusers
described above indicates that punishing abusers from one category will fail to provide a general
deterrent effect across categorical lines. For example, there is no reason to think that punishing
leaders and intellectual architects will deter on-the-ground abusers.391 Likewise, punishing active
abusers is unlikely to deter passive opportunists.
The problems presented by deterring across classes are common to all categories identified
above. Whether the punishing authority is a transitional regime, an international organization, or a
foreign state, potential abusers will not feel threatened by punishments applied to characters playing
different roles. To the contrary, those who might feel some empathetic connection to Slobodan
Milosevic, say, would more likely be motivated to reduce their apparent responsibility by creating a
shield of plausible deniability or by spreading responsibility392 than to refrain from pursuing
ideologically motivated programs of abuse.393
Taking account of these concerns seems to argue in favor of broader, more inclusive
prosecutorial strategies that can capture the attention of all prospective abusers. As I pointed out
above, however, it is simply impossible for transitions to prosecute everyone who has had a hand in
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pre-transitional abuses. Some selections must be made. In order to both meet this constraint and
avoid the difficulties of cross-class deterrence, a transition might elect to prosecute representatives
from each category in the hope of striking fear in the hearts of other caste members.394 While this
inverted class action approach has some immediate appeal, it fails to address the core worry that I
have identified.
The “cross-class” problem points out that transitional trials and punishments cannot provide
substantial certainty of punishment. Total immunity of a class of bad actors fails utterly to deter
because it leaves members of that class certain that they will not be punished. Symbolic punishment
of a few members of a class that may number in the millions fails to deter because it does not
provide the necessary degree of certainty.395
Unlike cross-class concerns, risk problems derived from intra-class selectivity do not affect
all abuser categories equally. Selectivity concerns counsel against picking punitive projects that
cannot be completed.396 By contrast, projects that can be completed may provide sufficient promise
of deterring those similarly situated in other regimes.397 These considerations recommend
prosecutions focused on high-level leaders.398 Leaders comprise a group sufficiently small to allow
complete, and therefore effective, deterrence programs.399 Leaders, exposed to the international
sphere, also have more perfect information, enhancing their subjective exposure to threats from
international trials. Programs that focus on top leaders therefore provide real hope of creating
394
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productive individual and general deterrence effects, particularly if pursued through stable and
predictable international enforcement regimes.400

E. Proximity Concerns and the Limited Prospects of Deterrence
Ignorance and uncertainty, along with delay and debates about the actual rationality of most
criminals form the core of stable state contests about deterrence.401 My discussion of the subjective
orientations of pre-transitional abusers to their bad acts has already substantially increased these
concerns in the transitional context, as have concerns about the degree of risk of punishment that
can be brought to bear on pre-transitional agents. Failures to communicate derived from isolation
and ignorance further diminish the possibility that a general deterrence effect can affect institutional
violence in abusive states.
In stable states, legislatures and judges do not have direct lines of communication with
prospective criminals.402 This allows criminals and potential criminals to discount or misunderstand
the possible costs of their crimes.403 In the transitional context these problems are magnified. If
domestic authorities are conducting trials then the deterrent threats postdate abuses. With respect
to past wrongs, then, trials serve no deterrent purpose at all. If transition itself can prevent future
domestic abuses, then there is no reason to conduct domestic trials to deter domestic abuse.
Domestic trials designed to produce a general deterrence effect in other countries are equally
unpromising. Though the threat derived from a previous transition in country A is prospective with
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respect to those in country B, any domestic trials eventually conducted in B still require the
retroactive enforcement of codes and punishments novel to citizens in B. This natural isolation of
abusers limits the hope of using domestic prosecutions to communicate clearly with those living in
other abusive regimes,404 particularly given the fact that a primary tool of abusive regimes is isolation
of its citizens from the international human rights culture and its members.405
Citizens of abusive regimes must piece together inevitably diverse and conflicting
interpretations of events in foreign transitions.406 It is unlikely that these filtered facts and rumorfilled theories will provide a clear and coherent deterrent threat.407 Thus, there is little hope that,
however well thought out, the deterrent message from a transitioning country will be felt and heard
by those living under foreign regimes.
International authorities or a single nation acting as a global prosecutor for crimes against
humanity might produce a consistent message.408 It remains uncertain, however, that residents of
abusive regimes can or will feel the threat of these foreign prosecutions.409 Mass violence and
institutionalized human rights abuses are a result of the coordinated efforts of abusive regimes.410
Abusers on the ground may, then, have no clear idea about what goes on outside their borders. To
the extent that they do, the messages sent by international prosecutions is inevitably obfuscated, if
404
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not perverted, by the abusive regime. True believers are particularly vulnerable to counter-claims on
behavior made by an abusive public face of law since they are easily convinced of global conspiracies
against their causes.411
Though, as I have pointed out, leaders who are true believers may not properly account for
threats of punishment from an International Criminal Court or Belgium, say, they are certainly in a
position to have clear and convincing evidence that they are vulnerable to prosecution. We may
hope, then, that leaders directly exposed and responsible to international law may be deterred by the
prosecution of those like them.412 This may be an unrealistic hope, given the horrible potentials of
ambition and zealotry,413 but at least there is structural promise of deterrence in these cases. There is
little or none with respect to those living behind the veil of an abusive public face of law.

F. Immediacy and the Limited Prospects of Transitional Deterrence
Immediacy is central to the effectiveness of general deterrence strategies.414 Criminals
naturally discount threats of punishment that are too far in the future.415 As argued above, most
who commit abuses in pre-transitions are unlikely to feel the threat of punishment from
international agents. For those who might feel some external threat, the threat is not immediate or
definite enough to provide a significant deterrent effect, given that immediately present domestic
institutions support abuse through, at least, the public face of law.
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True believers are unlikely to either respect or fear external threats.416 Moreover, their
commitments to the normative, ontological, and teleological systems that justify abuses, in
combination with commitments to abusive regimes, make them comfortable with risk.417 Domestic
opportunists might be more vulnerable to deterrence, but they too act within the mediating threat
structure of an abusive regime, and are more likely to act in accordance with these immediate
demands, discounting remote, vague, external, and future threats.418
Those acting under duress are even less likely to be deterred by the distant threats of outside
agencies. By definition, these individuals are both risk averse and predisposed not to commit human
rights abuses. They participate in the violence only because of direct and immediate danger to them
or their families. Like opportunists, it is unreasonable to expect them to expose themselves to
immediate harm in order to avoid distant and remote threats of punishment.
Immediacy is also a problem for leaders. In order to feel the force of any deterrent threat,
they must imagine that their power is limited and that their reign will end—and soon.
Unfortunately, humility and a healthy sense of mortal vulnerability are not common characteristics
of despots. Zealots and leaders motivated by ambition are unlikely to modify their behavior by
looking toward the day when they will have fallen from power. While this concern is real enough, it
is not a structural problem. The worry is essentially the same as the more general concern that
criminals are hard to deter because they do not commit their crimes expecting to be caught.419 In
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theory, then, an international enforcement regime could provide sufficient risk of punishment for
leaders directly exposed to international law.

G. Transitions Deter Future Domestic Abuses
As with all policies justified by a balancing of consequences, punishment as deterrence must
provide more benefit than harm.420 Trials present real risks of harm to transitions and transitional
goals of peace, stability, and the rule of law.421 These risks are justified only if there is no less costly
way to prevent future abuses.422 Trials, with the exception of trials focused on high-level leaders, do
not add significantly to the deterrent effects provided by transition itself. Taking account of this
balance points toward a strategy of vertically limited trials identical to that proposed by my excusecentered approach.
One of the main arguments advanced in this article is that human rights abuses on a scale
that calls for transitional justice are a function of abusive cultures and systems of institutionalized
violence that constitute an abusive public face of law. Absent a pervasive and institutionalized antiSemitism the Holocaust would not have happened.423 Absent widespread commitments to a
“Hamitic myth,” supported by public institutions, there would have been no slaughter in Rwanda.424
Without a war on communism, accompanying beliefs about the pernicious communist threat, and an
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institutional reliance on the military there would have been no “Dirty War” in Argentina.425 This
suggests a simple objection to deterrence in transitions.
If large-scale human rights abuses are, in part, a function of extraordinary historical, political,
legal, and cultural circumstances that create unique incentive structures,426 and transitions, by their
nature, mark a shift in these conditions, then transitions may expect that there will be an
accompanying shift in citizens’ public behavior.427 For those whose actions were a function of
conditions in the past regime, shifting conditions in transition prevent future abuses by removing
motivation, justification, and opportunity. Given transitional shifts in the public face of law,
punishment does not provide additional benefit with respect to preventing future abuses.428 This is
true individually and generally.
Prompt and certain prosecutions of post-transitional bad actors will serve notice of a new
regime’s authority and its commitment to securing human rights. It will also heighten transitional
notice, targeting deterrent threats at those who are contemplating future abuse. Retroactive
punishment of pre-transitional crimes does not, as I have argued, so clearly communicate the
objective and direction of the new state’s deterrent will;429 nor would it be narrowly targeted to the
audience most in need. Moreover, retrospective trials would draw on limited police and judicial
resources, limiting the capacity of a new regime to deal with new offenses quickly and consistently.430
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The purposes of prospective deterrence are, then, best served by punishing post-transitional
offenses rather than reaching into the past.
One might argue that some criminal review of past wrongs might make these deterrent
threats more convincing.431 I admit the possibility of this effect. However, doing so does not
commit me to more trials than those already allowed under my excuse-limited scheme. Punishing
high-level leaders would certainly serve as sufficient demonstration of a new regime’s commitment
to protect rights once routinely violated. Selective punishment of others would serve no additional
good. The better course in most cases is to focus on truth commissions and other procedures
designed to capitalize on the transitional potential of former abusers and solidify transitional
commitments.432 Social conversion is, of course, a long-term goal. In the meantime, prosecutions
based on post-transitional offenses provide necessary deterrence and security.

H. Transitions Obviate the Need for Incapacitation
A transitional regime might justify incarceration for the practical purpose of incapacitation.433
On closer examination, however, the need for incapacitation and the balance of its costs and
benefits suggests limiting its application in ways similar to those of deterrence. Incapacitation faces
two main objections in stable states. First, incapacitation presents a moral problem in that
individuals are punished for offenses that they have not yet committed.434 Second, incapacitation
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depends on an ability to predict accurately who is likely to commit crimes in the future.435 Both
these concerns are salient to transitional justice.
The first objection is primarily moral and, for a consequentialist, is not difficult to set aside.
We do, as a matter of fact, deny innocent people their freedom because of the potential danger they
pose to the public when we institute quarantines. Such policies are warranted in light of necessity
and a familiar balance of harm and benefit.436 Loss of freedom and compromises against fairness
may be costs in the equation, but are not determinative. The same is true of potential criminals.
They pose a risk of harm accruing to society. In transitions they may even represent a risk of
counter-revolution and a return to the oppressive ways of the past. This seems like more than
enough danger to justify incapacitation. It may seem unfair to make assumptions, but the alternative
is to ask a young democracy to bear the burden of a severe risk. An argument can be made, then,
that transitions should not worry too much about making abusers, who have already committed
harmful, though not criminal, acts, shoulder the risk instead.
Of course, no society can put everyone in prison. To justify incapacitation there must be
some way to narrow the numbers, identifying particular individuals or narrow classes for isolation.
Despite the popular concerns that incapacitation can justify imprisoning folks with an extra Y
chromosome,437 or a history of being abused as children,438 this is not what is at stake in serious
jurisprudence.439 Most incapacitation literature is only interested in predicting recidivism and
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criminal advancement.440 This is no easy task; and even the best models are accurate only one-third
of the time.441 Using these results as the basis for sentencing would mean that sixty-six percent of
the resources dedicated to incapacitation strategies would have been wasted. Even if such a low
average could overcome moral objections, this is not an acceptable ratio in resource-starved
transitional societies.
These concerns provide a new perspective on the agency arguments from Sections II and III
of this article. Incapacitation as a justification for imprisonment is grounded in a past offense.442
Most advocates of incapacitation do not see abstract risk, as a function of genetics, class, race, or
environment, as sufficient to warrant imprisonment. This is, in part, due to moral concerns, but it
also reflects the fact that risk predictions are nearly useless in non-criminal populations. An overt
criminal act is, thus, a necessary risk factor.443 Guilt is a necessary first step for justifying
incapacitation.444 This puts us back on the hook of earlier concerns about establishing guilt for
many abusers from the past regime.
The reader might think that this misses the point slightly. Former abusers have, after all,
done wrong. Whether the overt act is a “crime” or not is irrelevant next to the fact that it signifies a
propensity to such activities and presents a risk to the new regime. This response fails to understand
the significance of public agency here and in the legality discussion above. The consequentialist, to
justify incapacitation in transitions, must rely almost exclusively on past acts that were publicly
accepted, and sometimes expected, as evidence that those who followed the rules in the past will
440
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break them in the future. This requires making the unwarranted assumption that former abusers will
not change their behavior as the political culture and legal structure of society change. An agentcentered understanding of pre-transitional abuses should lead us to see many, if not most, former
abusers as candidates for change.445 Presuming, without further warrant, that they are not eligible
for reform, raises moral concerns that also have consequential import.
Given the fact of transition and accompanying shifts in law and public norms, it seems
neither fair nor useful to assume that those who abided by the public face of law in the past will not
do so in the future. Moreover, the agency focus makes the point that strategies of broad
prosecution will alienate individuals who might be valuable to a transition, provided that they are not
under personal threat if it succeeds.446 Further, incapacitation policies run the danger of
perpetuating pre-transitional divisions,447 making counter-revolutions more likely,448 and increasing
the chances that the transition will ultimately fail to deter future crimes.449
This discussion preserves the possibility of punishing high-level leaders. Leaders have a
significant personal and ideological investment in counter-revolutions. They also have the
demonstrated capacity to motivate large groups of individuals to perpetrate horrific acts. Given
these demonstrated motives and capacities, incapacitation of leaders, through imprisonment or exile,
will frequently be a justifiable transitional cost, particularly if these leaders have perpetrated overt
acts during or after transition that present a direct threat to peace, stability, or the rule of law.
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As a final note on this topic it is worth pointing out a distinction between the political
necessities of transition and legal punishment. Though law and politics are heavily intertwined,
more so in transitions, there is still a distinction. Transitions are committed to transparency when
making decisions to punish.450 If security is the sole justification, that should be made explicit. If it
is for treasonous activity, that should be explicit. If it is simply a reflection of the transition itself, as
lustration might be,451 then this should be made explicit. Failure to provide public justifications runs
contrary to transitional commitments to democracy and the rule of law and replicates the
disarticulating use of power that defines abusive regimes.452

V.

THE EXCUSE–CENTERED APPROACH IN CONTEXT
Transitions cannot, due to practical realities, prosecute all or even most of those implicated

in widespread abuses perpetrated by and under abusive regimes.453 This selectivity poses a number
of threats to transitional justice programs. High among these is the hard-to-swallow fact that most
of those involved in past wrongs will not be held responsible.454 This failure to assign responsibility
carries with it the morally disturbing implication that those not punished are not culpable or guilty.455
Failures to prosecute also present the possibility that the truth of what happened in the past will
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never be publicly established,456 allowing abusers to carry on without consequence. Failure to
establish a publicly legitimate factual account of the past also perpetuates injustices against victims
by denying them the acknowledgement they deserve.457 This “oblivion”458 hampers efforts to
identify causes and consequences of pre-transitional institutions and abuses,459 limiting transitional
efforts to carryout effective reform.460 Without a publicly legitimate account of the past, transitions
may also face revisionism, denial, and perhaps, counterrevolution.461
These circumstances and concerns create tremendous theoretical and practical challenges for
justice in transitions. This article has sketched a solution to one of these: the need to provide
theoretical guidance and normative justification for prosecutorial selection. To this end, I have
argued that transitional justice programs should provide an affirmative defense that would, as a
matter of fact, excuse from criminal prosecution most of those associated with pre-transitional
abuses. While this is a valuable contribution to transitional jurisprudence, it does not solve other
transitional concerns, particularly those that flow from the gap between participation in abuses and
prosecution for past wrongs. For example, vertically limited trials do not fully appreciate the
complicity of those not prosecuted.462 While they do provide a forum for establishing the truth
about the past in broad strokes, prosecutions of a few top leaders do not provide public
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acknowledgment for most victims. Thus, they neither meet entirely demands for truth nor do they
avoid altogether the dangers of oblivion.463
In most transitions, these concerns have led to compromise programs, featuring limited
prosecutions that focus on top leaders, amnesties, truth commissions, and reparations.464 Many
European transitions have also utilized lustration.465 Just as prosecutorial selections may be criticized
as compromises against justice, the other elements of hybrid programs are usually seen as gap filling
strategies.466 Together, they provide the best approximation of justice in a very imperfect world.467
In this final section, I discuss how my excuse-centered approach can provide significant promise for
resolving these concerns while providing guidance and justification for other elements of hybrid
justice programs.

A. The Affirmative Defense Approach Guides and Justifies Prosecutorial Selection
Structuring prosecutorial selectivity around an affirmative defense has significant advantages
in the context of transitional justice specifically and transitions to democracy more generally. First, it
requires substantial engagement with abusers, victims, witnesses, and society. If the burden of
overcoming the defense fell on prosecutors then usual procedural protections and natural motives of
defendants to avoid punishment would prevent a full hearing of the facts and circumstances..468 By
463
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making the defense affirmative, transitions put the burden of revelation on defendants.469 Because
former abusers cannot claim the defense without producing evidence on their own behalves, making
the defense affirmative provides individual motivation for pre-transitional bad actors to participate
in revelatory processes such as truth commissions, dramatically enhancing the quality of the “truth”
produced by commissions.470
Second, making the defense affirmative gives prosecutors more control over selections.
Evidentiary limitations might well force officials to forgo prosecutions if defendants have a
presumptive defense. Affirmative defenses allow prosecutors to make principled decisions based on
real information rather than allowing circumstances to force them to make blind choices or to
provide de facto amnesties.471 Selections made on rational evidentiary grounds also preserve scarce
prosecutorial and judicial resources472 while providing publicly justifiable reasons for prosecutorial
selections.473

B. The Transitional Contributions of Truth Commissions
Truth commissions have been integral parts of transitional justice programs in many
countries.474 While a discussion of these procedures is beyond the scope of this article, this sub-
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section describes some of the goals and aspirations of commissions in order to explain how an
excuse-centered approach can advance these goals.
There are a number of truth commission models.475 At base, however, all share a common
conviction: that construction of a publicly legitimate and descriptively accurate account of the past is
critical to political struggle and reform in transitions to democracy.476 What counts as “truth” in this
context varies widely.477 At a minimum, truth commissions try to produce a detailed and accurate
account of what happened to whom, when, and how.478 Commissions also try to determine who
was implicated in past wrongs,479 why atrocities were committed,480 and how perpetrators were able
to pursue programs of destruction.481 The mandate of the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Committee, for example, was to “establish as complete a picture as possible—including antecedents,
circumstances, factors and context of such violations as well as the perspectives of the victims and
the motives and perspectives of the persons responsible for the commission of the violations.”482
The provision of a publicly acceptable account of the past serves several transitional goals.
Most prominent is prevention of future abuse.483 By uncovering the causes and circumstances of
past abuses, transitional regimes hope to develop new social norms and public procedures that will
475
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reduce the chance of future violence.484 In addition to content, then, truth commissions provide
important opportunities to model procedural commitments violated under the old regime.485 By
publicizing accounts of the past, for example, commissions mark a break from abusive regimes,
where opacity and rarified power are essential tools of disarticulate power.486 Commissions also
offer recognition of victims and the wrongs they have suffered,487 modeling transitional
commitments to democratic principles of recognition, inclusion, and participation.488
Truth commissions also count restoration and reconciliation high among their goals.489 By
providing opportunities for past abusers to confess and for victims to tell their stories, truth
commissions hope to reconcile a transitional society with its past and to set the stage for victims to
be reconciled with their abusers.490 Through this process of confrontation and reconciliation, truth
commissions aspire to establish the conditions necessary for social, political, and legal justice.491 In
addition, by identifying what went wrong in the past492 and charting new public norms and
procedures that will prevent future abuses,493 commissions establish and model the public
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commitments that form the foundation upon which a new society committed to democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law can be built and sustained.494
A publicly established truth about the past can also provide some consequences for
wrongdoers.495 While actual criminal punishment is usually divorced from or excluded by truth
commissions,496 publicized truth can provide a form of public shaming that is punitive in
character.497 By identifying wrongs and wrongdoers, often with the aid of dramatic victim testimony
and forensic reports, truth commissions also set the stage for individuals to recognize what they
have done and to assume moral accountability for the past.498 This educative function of truth
procedures is aided by victim participation,499 providing obvious benefits for prevention and
restoration.500
Civil society should play a critical role in and be a significant beneficiary of truth
commissions.501 South Africa provides a good example.502 There, daily events were broadcast and
nightly analyses conducted.503 The processes of the TRC, as well as its daily product, were publicly
accessible and were the source and topic of significant discussion and debate.504 Nigeria took a
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similar approach.505 This daily presence encourages truth seeking outside of the commission while
working to prevent oblivion, denial, and revisionism. Public truth commissions also provide a
model for civil society, establishing the groundwork of a transparent politics of inclusion.506
These varied goals require that commissions regard “truth” as multi-faceted.507 A primary
benefit of commissions, as compared to criminal trials,508 is a freedom from rules of evidence and
other procedural limitations on testimony, including rights against self-incrimination and limitations
on hearsay evidence.509 Truth commissions can afford these looser protocols because they cannot,
by definition, result in individualized criminal sanctions.510 Truth commissions provide plenty of
room for normative evaluation, however. Assessment of right and wrong is critical to
acknowledging what happened, recognizing the suffering of victims, and striking a contrast between
past and future.511 The latitude afforded to truth commissions also provides the opportunity to hear
from a wide variety of sources, including victims, witnesses, and abusers.512 Further, testimony can
take the form of narratives of personal experience.513 This flexibility expands further the scope of
truth while offering recognition to those whose stories were, in a past, suppressed and ignored.514
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Commissions need not produce a final decision or reflect a perfect consensus.515 Given the
broad scope of commissions, consensus may well be impossible.516 A consensus truth might also fail
to capture the complexity of the past.517 This is not a disadvantage. Destruction of diverse opinion
is, after all, a hallmark of abusive regimes.518 Forcing commissions to pursue a consensus view is, in
this light, radically undemocratic.519 What truth commissions can do is provide a shared experience
of pursuit and, by conducting themselves in the light of transitional commitments to human rights
and the rule of law, create a shared “universe of comprehensibility” of the past.520
Finally, truth commissions seek to define new social, political, and individual normative
identities. Anthony Duff and Jean Hampton, among others, have argued that trials play an
important role in society by expressing and reaffirming social and legal commitments.521 For these
theorists, the process of trial and punishment is a process of re-presenting social norms and
expressing social approbation and approval. Truth commissions have the same potential, though
their orientation is prospective and aspirational rather than retrospective.522

C. An Excuse-Centered Approach Justifies and Organizes Truth Commissions
The excuse-centered approach to transitional justice proposed here provides important
structural guidance and motivational support for truth commissions. It also advances the goals and
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opportunities of truth commissions while avoiding the most pernicious objections to these
procedures and the amnesties that they entail.
A critical practical feature of the defense proposed is that it is affirmative. Within the rule of
law embraced by transitions, prosecutors carry the burden of proof in criminal trials.523 Affirmative
defenses represent an exception to this rule. Defendants who assert an affirmative defense must
prove the elements of the proposed defense.524 Truth commissions are ideal forums for developing
the record needed to make these selections, particularly if those who seek to avoid prosecution must
testify about what happened, what they did, and why.525 They cannot be taken at their word, of
course. Commissioners must investigate these accounts by hearing additional testimony and by
examining relevant evidence.526 After the investigation is complete, commissioners acting within the
model I am developing here would make recommendations to prosecutors who will make final
selections based on these recommendations and their own independent assessments.527
A model of transition justice that requires testimony at a truth commission as a pre-requisite
for securing immunity from prosecution may seem to create motivational528 and, perhaps, due
process problems.529 These concerns are easily salved by “use immunity” and “derivative use-
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immunity” arrangements.530 Within these agreements, prosecutors may not use information learned,
from compelled testimony to prosecute their case against the accused.531
This excuse-centered structure enhances significantly the truth seeking potential of
commissions. Because commissioners cannot produce a verdict, their recommendations to
prosecutors are not binding, and the evidence they produce is not accessible for prosecutions,
commissions are free of the constraints and pressures of evidentiary rules and due process
protections. This freedom from constraints allows commissions to develop more detailed and
complete accounts of the past than would be possible in a criminal trial.532 Rather than establishing
what truth they can within procedural constraints, commissioners can, and should, concentrate on
developing an extensive and detailed account of what happened, who was involved, and why.533
These open procedures produce accounts of the past that are broader, deeper, more detailed, more
accessible, more acceptable, and more legitimate in the public eye than would be possible in trials.534
Unlike criminal trials, truth commissions organized for the purpose of making prosecutorial
selections provide a compelling motivational structure that supports truth seeking.535 First, by virtue
of the formal separation between commissions and trials, nothing a former abuser says in a truth
commission procedure can be used against him. Second, where admission to crimes in a criminal
trial brings the promise of punishment, admission to abuses before a truth commission offers hope
of security from prosecution. Third, abusers know that lies and omissions may leave them
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vulnerable to future prosecution.536 Finally, because testimony cannot be used to prosecute others,
witnesses, including both victims and abusers, need not fear reprisals. Further, as opposed to
criminal trials, victims are not limited as to the form of their testimony or subjected to aggressive
cross-examination.537 Instead, victims tell their stories in their own ways, offering a moment of
public acknowledgment, denied to them by oppressive regimes and by trials, where the focus is on
the defendant and his rights.538
This, then, is the outline of how the excuse-centered approach would function procedurally
within a broader transitional justice program. Open truth commission procedures, protected by use
immunity safeguards, would provide a forum for developing a full account of the past. At
reasonable times during these procedures, commissioners would make recommendations to
prosecutors regarding who should and should not benefit from the proposed affirmative excuse.
Prosecutors would make the final decision. Any bargains accepted by prosecutors would ultimately
be subject to revocation if later discoveries revealed that an abuser has withheld significant facts
about his past bad acts.539 Alternatively, if officials decide to prosecute an abuser based on or
despite the recommendations of commissioners, then they would not be allowed to make
investigative or prosecutorial use of testimony or evidence presented to a commission.
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D. An Excuse-Centered Approach Resolves Dilemmas of Truth Commissions
Truth commissions, as they are usually understood, propose a “trade-off” between justice, as
criminal punishment, and truth.540 In order to minimize what is lost in this trade-off, advocates for
commissions have developed jurisprudential theories designed to satisfy the call for justice in
transitions.541 In “The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions,” Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson argue that these theories must satisfy three minimal demands.542 First, commissions
must appeal to a moral principle that is at least comparable to the moral principle of punishment
sacrificed in the trade-off.543 Second, commissions, in order to reflect commitments to democracy,
human rights, and the rule of law, and in order to maximize the public legitimacy of the truth they
produce, must be inclusive and broad in spectrum, providing an opportunity for recognition and
participation to as many individuals as possible, including both victims and abusers.544 Third,
commissions must develop morally rich practices that reflect their principled goals but also provide
a model for democratic and rule of law procedures going forward.545 The second and third
requirements are simple design challenges. The more difficult task is to provide a morally satisfying
justification for the “trade-off.” Theories of “restorative justice” have emerged as the most
common response.546
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The central insight of restorative justice in the transitional context is that pre-transitional
abuses are symptoms of social and political pathologies. Liberal revolutions represent breaks with
the past.547 Restorative procedures provide a path to the future by laying the groundwork for social,
political, and legal change.548 In addition, they seek to produce shifts in public institutions and the
public and private consciousnesses of citizens.549 The ultimate goal, of course, is to reconcile a
transitional society with its past, and, perhaps, victims with abusers, in order to prepare the ground
for a stable society dedicated to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.550
Criminal punishment represents, in the restorative justice scheme, both a failure to
appreciate the unique features of past abuses and a practical threat to the success of transition.551 So
viewed, broad programs of prosecution conflict, theoretically and practically, with transitional
demands to restore or create the conditions necessary to ensure the success of a new regime.552
Given this conflict, restorative justice advocates argue that establishment of a stable post-transitional
society provides a moral imperative that trumps obligations to punish.553
In place of punishment, restorative justice seeks to, descriptively enough, restore (or create)
the social conditions necessary to ensure the success of transition.554 Truth commissions, by
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focusing on admission and contrition555 rather than adversarial prosecution and punishment, better
reflect the demands of restorative justice.556 In addition, careful attention to how commissions
conduct their business provides the promise that they can construct a foundation for transitional
commitments to human rights and the rule of law and provide a model for democratic
procedures.557 These goals, along with more purely practical demands bound up with resource
allocation and stability,558 justify the truth for justice trade-off.
I think that the restorative rationale for truth commissions presents serious concerns. While
a full discussion of these is beyond the scope of this article, it is enough for now to recognize that
even these hopeful theories must live with sighs of resignation lurking in the background.559
Whether truth commissions mean to fill in the gaps or to provide an exclusive alternative to trials,
theorists and practitioners admit that something is being given up.560 Public admission and even
public shame are not what most think about when they call for punishing abusers.561 Solace taken
from restorative justice theories is just that, solace. The trade-off still exists, leaving truth
commissions and interests in restoration with the damning label of “best possible justice.”562
Truth commissions conducted within an excuse-centered approach need not wither in this
darkness. Suggestions that commissions involve a trade-off are only sensible if one assumes that
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those offered amnesty should be punished, but, due to circumstances, cannot be. Within the excusecentered approach, those implicated in past wrongs are invited to participate in truth seeking
procedures, along with victims, witnesses, and other relevant sources, in order to determine what
justice demands. Provision of an excuse within this model is, by definition, in accord with the
demands of justice. Thus, truth commissions conducted in service of an excuse-centered approach
do not trade truth for justice; they elicit truth in the service of justice. Provision of an excuse does not
imply an exchange of truth for punitive right because those who qualify for the affirmative excuse
should not be punished.
None of this discussion minimizes the significant benefits to transitions that truth
commissions may bring in terms of restoration and other important goals. Within an excusecentered jurisprudence of transitional justice, these goals just do not provide primary justification for
truth commissions. Rather, commissions serve criminal justice needs first. This is what justifies
their place in a transitional justice programs.
This brief discussion does not claim to address sufficiently all of the intriguing issues raised
by truth commissions in the context of transitional justice. It is meant only to present some of the
most significant concerns in order to explain how an affirmative excuse-centered approach can
provide structural and theoretical support for commissions. It also points out some of the features
that commissions, conducted at the service of prosecutorial selections, must have. While further
discussion of the issues raised in this section would be well worth the time spent, such it is beyond
the narrow scope of this article. The present purpose is only to provide a schematic account of the
role that truth commissions play in a transitional justice strategy guided by the proposed affirmative
defense.
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VI.

Conclusion
This article has defended the proposition that most of those implicated in wrongs

committed by and under abusive regimes should not be subject to criminal prosecution. It has
argued that the prevailing social, legal, and political conditions that characterize abusive regimes
provide good reason to excuse those who acted consistently with an abusive public face of law,
which is a distinguishing feature of pre-transitional regimes. Provision of this excuse does not deny
that those implicated in pre-transitional abuses have done wrong. They certainly have. Consistent
with this fact, the excuse preserves room for assignments of moral and political guilt.563
None of this discussion makes past events disappear. Clarifying the standing of law and
public agents in transitions does not meet all transitional justice requirements. It does, however,
provide a better picture of what a full transitional justice program might look like. First, it will be
centered on extending and developing transitional reforms committed to democracy, the rule of law,
and human rights.564 Second, the process must provide for the constructive participation of all those
affected by these changes, including those who legitimately claim the legality defense.565 Third, as a
function of these two, transitional justice programs must provide opportunities for citizens to
transition into their new public roles.566 Public agents are candidates for change just as are public
norms; they should be recognized as participants in a process.567
Truth commissions as part of the excuse-centered approach fit the unique conditions of
transitions. For a justice to be transitional it must acknowledge that it has a duty to justify and
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establish new public norms.568 This implies taking a coordinative orientation569 with respect to most
involved in events of the past, while retaining the goal of social expression that is central to both
justification and application of public law.570 By putting a priority on establishing facts, while
acknowledging that most participants in past events cannot be held criminally liable, truth
commissions reflect this premium on coordination.
Transitions are not wholly coordinative enterprises, of course. As in functioning
democracies, there are coercive outcomes. Those who disagree with changes in public
consciousness and norms cannot opt for the old ways. There is another aspect to the focus on
public agency that comes to the fore here. Even Kant, perhaps the staunchest of the legal
deontologists, understood that law has an instrumental character.571 In and after transitions the
mark of public agency provides for the possibility that those who acted in accord with the public
face of law in the past will do the same when the law changes. At least, absent compelling evidence
to the contrary, a transitional regime should assume that they will.
The provision of an affirmative defense for most pre-transitional bad actors also preserves
the possibility of reparations for victims of the past regime.572 “Responsibility” is a notoriously
difficult word. One use of responsibility is found in criminal law. “Responsible” can also have a
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moral dimension, suggesting a free act of will for which the actor is held to blame.573 It can also
have a political dimension.574 Finally, “responsibility” can have a looser meaning, more prominent in
some branches of tort law that relies on cause as a key feature generating responsibility to repair.575
Forgoing criminal blame does not release individuals from responsibility for contributing to the
success and stability of the new regime. First, though abusers may not be punished, they are still
morally culpable for their acts.576 Second, recognizing that many agents of harm in the past regime
were acting according to the demands placed on them in their public roles suggests that
responsibility for many pre-transitional abuses falls also on the society that made them possible.577
Corresponding assignments of moral and political guilt provide ample justification for reparations.578
Individual duties to repair will vary, of course. Citizens may bear a higher tax burden in order to pay
for social programs that benefit victims.579 Corporations and states that realized gains by colluding
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with an abusive regime may be required to return ill-gotten profits and to contribute to reform and
reparation programs.580 Others may be called upon to return land or other property appropriated
under the eye of the old guard.581 What is important, however, is that these duties flow not from
criminal liability but from a recognition that abuses of the past would not have occurred but for the
complicity of an abusive society, its members, and enablers.
As a practical matter, the excuse-centered approach advanced here does not suggest radical
changes to transitional justice practice. Due to a number of circumstances, most transitional regimes
adopt hybrid strategies of transitional justice that look much like the excuse-centered program.
What the approach offers is normative justification and guidance for what otherwise are ad hoc
strategies that appear to involve significant compromises against justice. By providing a detailed
excuse and defending its elements against common concerns that circulate through transitional
justice debates, this article has attempted to provide practical as well as theoretical guidance for
practitioners faced with the unique challenges of seeking justice in transitions.
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